Drive as such is death-drive, the “spontaneous” life-flow of generation and corruption getting “stuck” onto some accidental particularity.

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/844834892437348354 http://ift.tt/2oNfhJS

The vagina is impossi­ble, but it is not simply an illusion. …You think the vagina is the Thing itself, but really it’s not

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/844477589230116864 http://ift.tt/2oVtX4U

it is only the imperceptible “something,” a pure appearance which cannot be grounded in a substantial property, that makes something divine.

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/844108861867016194 http://ift.tt/2pt1TYn

The difficulty isnt to get rid fetishizing god but to grasp the inner necessity of the incarnation of our purely spiritual selfrelationality

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/843751534374674432 http://ift.tt/2oWgPgr

is it possible to live in our daily experience the fact that Self doesn’t exist?

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/843386772788838400 http://ift.tt/2qobVco

Is (what we usually refer to as) religion not a defence against this abyss, this void, imagining a supreme Being ‘which guarantees meaning’?

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/843022942917287938 http://ift.tt/2oQMHT0

All attempts to thoroughly ‘defetishize’ religion are condemned to fail.

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We should read “Moses and Monotheism” as precisely Freud’s answer to anti–Semitism. He doesn’t defend Jews, he strikes against Jews themselves. He deprives Jews of one of the most important parts of their legacy — his point was that Moses was not one of us. Which is why some of his friends were utterly shocked, “Oh my god, in these difficult times, you are taking from us one of our last pillars of hope.” I think Freud did the right thing. The Nazis believed that Jews were something special, albeit in a negative way. The true way to combat anti–Semitism is to do as Freud did, to say that “We are not what you secretly think that we are.”

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domination: antagonism is its very source, so it has to be there, although ideologically obfuscated. In the case of sexual difference, it is, of course, women who pay the price for this operation: as we can see in an exemplary way in Muslim fundamentalism, the enforced harmony of the sexes is based on the containment of women to their ‘proper place’, i.e. a liberated, sexually active woman is seen as a main threat to social stability. In the case of class difference, the antagonism is obfuscated through metaphors of society as an organism whose unity can be disturbed by intruding enemies.

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‘Absolute Otherness’ is ‘the subject beyond subjectivization’: 'the 'point of failure of every identification’

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/842301989329469440 http://ift.tt/2q6Z4fr

The freedom of the modern subject: …Prohibition re-emerges in the guise of the ferocious superego that fills the subject with guilt.

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/841935789911097345 http://ift.tt/2oHXEpM

The treasure in the beloved is just a deceiving fetish, the true treasure is the fragile beloved

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NATO is intervening in order to protect the Kosovar victims, it is at the same time well taking care that THEY WILL REMAIN VICTIMS, not an active politico.military force capable of defending itself. The strategy of NATO is thus perverse in the precise Freudian sense of the term: it is itself (co)responsible for the calamity against which it offers itself as a remedy

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The precautionary principle is thoroughly ingrained in the self-conception of Germany and a disregard for it is often met with a general feeling of incomprehension and emotional outrage. what bothers me apropos of the recent comeback of human rights is that they rely on what Nietzsche identified as the moralistic ressentiment and envy: they imply the fake gesture of the disavowed politics, of assuming a ‘moral’, depoliticized stance in order to make a stronger political case. We are dealing here with a perverted version of what, in the good old days of dissidence, Vaclav Havel called the 'power of the powerless’: one manipulates one’s powerlessness as a stratageme in order to gain more power, in exactly the same way that today, in our politically correct times, in order for one’s voice to gain authority, one has to legitimize oneself as being some kind of a (potential or actual) victim of power.

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What makes us happy is not to get what we want. But to dream about it.

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/840846124860731392 http://ift.tt/2ojjOmQ

‘How should we fight racism?’ I said with progressive racism. We should adopt racism. They looked at me like - ‘Are you crazy?’ There is a way to practise - I wouldn’t say racist jokes because precisely they are no longer racist take my own country: till the 80s in ex-Yugoslavia, we all the time exchanged dirty jokes about one and the other nation. And I loved them. But this didn’t function as racist jokes but as a kind of a shared obscenity which meant a way of solidarity. …I meet a guy from Montenegro. …We immediately start to tell to each other dirty jokes about the other and about ourselves. …The standard Montenegro story, Montenegrins are supposed to be lazy and they are an earthquake country. So how does a Montenegro guy masturbate? He digs a hole in the earth, puts the penis in and waits for the earthquake. Because he is too lazy even to - but what I want to say is that this …absolutely wasn’t racism, it was solidarity. The message was: we are not just this, you know, cold, politically correct - ooh, what nice food you have, what nice ethnic dances. I don’t care about your stupid, ethnic dances! I want dirty jokes, you know!

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Towards the beginning of the film,“Speed”, Keanu Reeves confronts the terrorist blackmailer played as usual by Dennis Hopper. This blackmailer holds a gun to Keanu Reeves’ partner. What does Reeves do? He doesn’t shoot the terrorist in order to liberate his partner as you would expect. He shoots his partner in the leg. This unexpected gesture of, shooting at your own side totally perplexes the terrorist and Reeves saves the day. …ways have this dimension of sacrificing the most precious part of yourself. This is the generative moment of subjectivity.

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rituals of social institutions do not suffice, the subject has to presuppose the symbolic institution, an ideal structure [to imbue them]

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/840483738928701440 http://ift.tt/2pR6TIZ

The essence that we search for is nothing more than apearance as appearance.

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/840121359514521600 http://ift.tt/2odt6AP

Justine in Lars von Triers Film ‘Melancholia’ ist kein schützender Herr, der eine schöne Lüge zur Verfügung stellt. Was sie bereitstellt, ist eine symbolische Fiktion, die selbstverständlich keine magische Wirkung hat, die aber auf der Ebene der Panikvermeidung funktioniert. Justines Ansatz ist es uns nicht angesichts der nahenden Katastrophe zu blenden: Die »Zauberhöhle befähigt uns, das Ende freudig hinzunehmen

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we should unconditionally resist the temptation to “understand” Arab anti-Semitism (where we really encounter it) as a “natural” reaction to the sad plight of the Palestinians; or to “understand” the Israeli measures as a “natural” reaction against the background of the memory of the Holocaust. There should be no “understanding” for the fact that, in many — if not most — Arab countries, Hitler is still considered a hero

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“officially”, he strives desperately for certainty, for an unambiguous answer that would provide the remedy against the worm of doubt that is consuming him; actually, the true catastrophe he is trying to evade at any price is this very solution, the emergence of a final, unambiguous answer; which is why he endlessly sticks to his uncertain, indeterminate, oscillating status

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The task is to drop the form of religion that persists in secular humanism… Only in Christianity god himself ceases to believe in himself.

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/839762943696850944 http://ift.tt/2pDWvkI

in Buddhist enlightenment the Self directly, in its self-experience, assumes its own nonbeing, i.e. recognizes itself as a ‘simulated self’.

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/839401635591909376 http://ift.tt/2pgIigS

The Real is the appearance as appearance, it appears WITHIN appearances, it is also NOTHING BUT its own appearance, a GRIMACE of reality.

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/839036686290010112 http://ift.tt/2oJNZCq

Desire is a prohibition against going beyond a limit in jouissance, against a turmoil of excessive jouissance of a consummated relationship.

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The neurotic (mis)perceives the Other as amassing jouissance, and steals little crumbs of jouissance from the Other

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Kafka’s works stage a search for the divine in our deserted secular world

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/837949514799534080 http://ift.tt/2oF5m5y

insofar as the speaking subject is always already spoken, i.e., insofar as he cannot master the effects of what he is saying: he always says more than he “intended to say,” and this surplus of what is effectively said over the intended meaning puts in to words the repressed content-in it, “the repressed returns.” What are symptoms qua “returns of the repressed” if not such slips of the tongue by means of which “the letter arrives at its destination,” i.e., by means of which the big Other returns to the subject his own message in its true form? If instead of saying “Thereby I proclaim the session open,” I say “Thereby I proclaim the session closed,” do I not get, in the most literal sense, my own message back in its true, inverted form? So what could, at this level, the Derridean notion that a letter can also miss its destination mean? That the repressed can also not return-yet by claiming this, we entangle ourselves in a naive substantialist notion of the unconscious as a positive entity ontologically preceding its “returns,” i.e., symptoms qua compromise formations, a notion competently called in question by Derrida himself.

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Hitchcock’s benevolent-sadistic playing with the spectator…makes the spectator shrink back by confronting him with the full consequence of the realization of his desire (“you want this evil person killed? OK, you will have it-with all the nauseating details you wanted to pass over in silence..”). In short, Hitchcock’s “sadism” corresponds exactly to the superego’s “malevolent neutrality:” he is nothing but a neutral “purveyor of truth,” giving us only what we wanted, but including in the package the part of it that we prefer to ignore. This reverse of the subject’s message is its repressed; …Here, we cannot but repeat after Lacan: there is no repression previous to the return of the repressed; the repressed content does not precede its return in symptoms, there is no way to conceive it in its purity undistorted by “compromises” that characterize the formation of the symptoms.

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He gets back from the other his own message in its inverted, true form, i.e., when the true dimension of his own “letter” (teaching) reaches…himself-he is shaken and shrinks back from the consequence of his words, unprepared to recognize in them his own truth.

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the sender always receives from the receiver his own message in reverse form,“ "the repressed always returns,” “the frame itself is always being framed by part of its content,” “we cannot escape the symbolic debt, it always has to be settled,” which are all ultimately variations on the same basic premise that “there is no metalanguage.” So let us begin by explaining the impossibility of metalanguage apropos of the Hegelian figure of the “Beautiful Soul,” deploring the wicked ways of the world from the position of an innocent, impassive victim. The “Beautiful Soul” pretends to speak a pure metalanguage, exempted from the corruption of the world, thereby concealing the way its own moans and groans partake actively in the corruption it denounces. In his “Intervention on Transference,” Lacan relies on the dialectic of the “Beautiful Why Does a Letter Always Arrive at Its Destination? / Soul” to designate the falsity of the hysterical subjective position: “Dora,” Freud’s famous analysand, complains of being reduced to a pure object in a play of intersubjective exchanges (her father is allegedly offering her to Mister K. as if in compensation for his own flirtation with Miss K.), i.e., she presents this exchange as an objective state of things in the face of which she is utterly helpless; Freud’s answer is that the function of this stance of passive victimization by cruel circumstances is just to conceal her complicity and collusion-the square of intersubjective exchanges can only sustain itself insofar as Dora assumes actively her role of victim, of an object of exchange, in other words, insofar as she finds libidinal satisfaction in it, insofar as this very renunciation procures for her a kind of perverse surplus enjoyment. A hysteric continually complains of how he cannot adapt himself to the reality of cruel manipulation, and the psychoanalytic answer to it is not “give up your empty dreams, life is cruel, accept it as it is” but quite the contrary “your moans and groans are false since, by means of them, you are only too well adapted to the reality of manipulation and exploitation:” by playing the role of helpless victim, the hysteric assumes the subjective position which enables him to “blackmail emotionally his environs,” as we would put it in today’s jargon. This answer, in which the “Beautiful Soul” is confronted with how it actually partakes of the wicked ways of the world, closes the circuit of communication: in it, the subject/sender receives from the addressee his own message in its true form, i.e., the true meaning of his moans and groans. In other words, in it, the letter that the subject put into circulation “arrives at its destination,” which was from the very beginning the sender himself: the letter arrives at its destination when the subject is finally forced to assume the true consequences of his activity. This is how Lacan…interpreted the Hegelian dictum about the rationality of the real (“What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational”): the true meaning of the subject’s words or deeds-their reason-is disclosed by their actual consequences, so the subject has no right to shrink back from them and say “But I didn’t mean it!

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The true lost object in melancholy is..desire.

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/841211007510953984 http://ift.tt/2ovmz1A

We are not finite and self-inconsistent because our activity is always thwarted by external obstacles; we are thwarted by external obstacles because we are finite and inconsistent. In other words, what the subject engaged in a struggle perceives as the enemy, the external obstacle he has to overcome, is the materialization of the subject’s immanent inconsistency: the struggling subject needs the figure of the enemy to sustain the illusion of his own consistency, his very identity hinges on his opposing the enemy, so much so that his (eventual) victory amounts to his own defeat or disintegration. As Hegel likes to put it, in fighting the external enemy, one (unknowingly) fights one’s own essence. So, far from celebrating engaged struggle, Hegel’s point is rather that every embattled position, every taking of sides, has to rely on a necessary illusion (the illusion that, once the enemy is annihilated, I will achieve the full realization of my being). This brings us to what would have been a properly Hegelian notion of ideology: the misapprehension of the condition of possibility (of what is an inherent constituent of your position) as the condition of impossibility (as an obstacle which prevents your full realization)—the ideological subject is unable to grasp how his entire identity hinges on what he perceives as the disturbing obstacle. This notion of ideology is not just an abstract mental exercise: it fits perfectly with fascist anti-Semitism as the most elementary form of ideology—one is even tempted to say: as ideology as such, kat’ exochen . The anti-Semitic figure of the Jew, the foreign intruder who disturbs and corrupts the harmony of the social order, is ultimately a fetishistic objectivization, a stand-in, for the “inconsistency” of the social order itself, for the immanent antagonism (“class struggle”) which generates the dynamic of its instability. Hegel’s interest in the “conflict of the opposites” is thus that of the neutral dialectical observer who discerns the “Cunning of Reason” at work in struggle: a subject engages in struggle, is defeated (as a rule, in his very victory), and this defeat brings him to his truth . We can clearly measure here the distance that separates Hegel from Nietzsche: the innocence of exuberant heroism that Nietzsche wants to resuscitate, the passion of risk, of fully engaging in a struggle, of victory or defeat—these are all absent; the “truth” of the struggle emerges only in and through defeat.

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For such an approach, Hegel remains a profoundly Christian thinker, a nihilist whose basic strategy is to repackage a profound defeat, the withdrawal from life in all its painful vitality, as a triumph of the absolute Subject. That is to say, from the standpoint of the Will to Power, the effective content of the Hegelian process is one long story of defeats and withdrawals, of sacrifices of vital self-assertion: again and again, one has to renounce vital engagement as still too “immediate” and “particular.” Exemplary is here Hegel’s passage from the Revolutionary Terror to the Kantian morality: the utilitarian subject of civil society, the subject who wants to reduce the State to being the guardian of his private safety and well-being, has to be crushed by the Terror of the revolutionary State which can annihilate him at any moment for no reason whatsoever (the subject is not punished for something he has done, for some particular content or act, but for the very fact of being an independent individual opposed to the universal)—this Terror is his “truth.” So how do we pass from Revolutionary Terror to Kant’s autonomous and free moral subject? By way of what, in more contemporary language, one could call a full identification with the aggressor: the subject should recognize in the external Terror, in this negativity which constantly threatens to annihilate him, the very core of his (universal) subjectivity; in other words, he should fully identify with it. Freedom is thus not freedom from a Master, but the replacement of one Master with another: the external Master is replaced with an internal one. The price for this identification is, of course, the sacrifice of all “pathological” particular content—duty should be accomplished “for the sake of duty.” …when one talks, one always dwells in the universal—which means that, with its entry into language, the subject loses its roots in the concrete life world. To put it in more pathetic terms, the moment I start to talk, I am no longer the sensually concrete I, since I am caught up in an impersonal mechanism which always makes me say something different from what I wanted to say—as the early Lacan liked to say, I am not speaking, I am being spoken by language. This is one way to understand what Lacan called “symbolic castration”: the price the subject pays for its “transubstantiation” from being the agent of a direct animal vitality to being a speaking subject whose identity is kept apart from the direct vitality of passions. A Nietzschean reading easily discerns in this reversal of Terror into autonomous morality a desperate strategy of turning defeat into triumph: instead of heroically fighting for one’s vital interests, one pre-emptively declares total surrender and gives up all content. Lebrun is here well aware how unjustified the standard critique of Hegel is according to which the dialectical reversal of utter negativity into a new higher positivity, of catastrophe into triumph, functions as a kind of deus ex machina , precluding the possibility that the catastrophe might be the final outcome of the process—the well-known common-sense argument: “But what if there is no reversal of negativity into a new positive order?” This argument misses the point, which is that this is, precisely, what happens in the Hegelian reversal: there is no real reversal of defeat into triumph but only a purely formal shift, a change of perspective, which tries to present defeat itself as a triumph. Nietzsche’s point is that this triumph is a fake, a cheap magician’s trick, a consolation prize for losing all that makes life worth living: the real loss of vitality is supplemented by a lifeless specter. In Lebrun’s Nietzschean reading, Hegel thus appears as a kind of atheist Christian philosopher: like Christianity, he locates the “truth” of all terrestrial finite reality in its (self-)annihilation—reality reaches its truth only through/in its self-destruction; unlike Christianity, Hegel is well aware that there is no Other World in which we will be repaid for our terrestrial losses: transcendence is absolutely immanent, what is “beyond” finite reality is nothing but the immanent process of its self-overcoming . Hegel’s name for this absolute immanence of transcendence is “absolute negativity,” as he makes clear in an exemplary way in the dialectics of Master and Servant: the Servant’s secure particular/finite identity is unsettled when, in experiencing the fear of death during his confrontation with the Master, he gets a whiff of the infinite power of negativity; through this experience, the Servant is forced to accept the worthlessness of his particular Self… …What, then, does the Servant get in exchange for renouncing all the wealth of his particular Self? Nothing —in overcoming his particular terrestrial Self, the Servant does not reach a higher level of a spiritual Self; all he has to do is to shift his position and recognize in (what appears to him as) the overwhelming power of destruction which threatens to obliterate his particular identity the absolute negativity which forms the very core of his own Self. In short, the subject has to fully identify with the force that threatens to wipe him out: what he feared in fearing death was the negative power of his own Self. There is thus no reversal of negativity into positive greatness—the only “greatness” here is this negativity itself. Or, with regard to suffering: Hegel’s point is not that the suffering brought about by the alienating labor of renunciation is an intermediary moment that must be patiently endured while we wait for our reward at the end of the tunnel—there is no prize or profit to be gained at the end for our patient submission; suffering and renunciation are their own reward, all that has to be done is to change our subjective position, to renounce our desperate clinging to our finite Selves with their “pathological” desires, to purify our Selves towards their universality. This is also how Hegel explains the overcoming of tyranny in the history of states: “One says that tyranny is overturned by the people because it is undignified, shameful, etc. In reality, it disappears simply because it is superfluous.”7 It becomes superfluous when people no longer need the external force of the tyrant to make them renounce their particular interests, but when they become “universal citizens” by directly identifying the core of their being with this universality—in short, people no longer need the external master when they are educated into doing the job of discipline and subordination themselves. The obverse of Hegel’s “nihilism” (all finite/determinate forms of life reach their “truth” in their self-overcoming) is its apparent opposite: in continuity with the Platonic metaphysical tradition, he is not ready to give negativity full rein, that is, his dialectics is ultimately an effort to “normalize” the excess of negativity. For late Plato already, the problem was how to relativize or contextualize non-being as a subordinate moment of being (non-being is always a particular/determinate lack of being measured by the fullness it fails to actualize; there is no non-being as such, there is always only, e.g., “green” which participates in non-being by not being “red” or any other color, etc.). In the same vein, Hegelian “negativity” serves to “proscribe absolute difference” or “non-being”:8 negativity is limited to the obliteration of all finite/immediate determinations. The process of negativity is thus not just a negative process of the self-destruction of the finite: it reaches its telos when finite/immediate determinations are mediated/maintained/elevated, posited in their “truth” as ideal notional determinations. What remains after negativity has done its work is the eternal parousia of the ideal notional structure. What is missing here, from the Nietzschean standpoint, is the affirmative no : the no of the joyous and heroic confrontation with the adversary, the no of struggle which aims at self-assertion, not self-sublation

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Acting out…attempts to attest once ‘innocence…’ to ‘shed the intolerable burdon of guilt’.

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/837585876565770242 http://ift.tt/2oEoX85

The ideal of the Ego is replaced by the narcissistic “big Ego”; it is no longer the case of an individual forced to integrate the demands of the environment constituted in the symbolic element of the ideal of the Ego, but of a “Narcissus” who “does not experience the game with sincerity” and who takes the rules of the environment as the external “rules of the game”. He experiences “social pressure” completely differently, not in terms of the ideal Ego but in terms of the “anal”, “sadomasochistic” Superego.

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In 2009, a government-backed tv advertising campaign urged Israeli Jews to report relatives abroad who were in danger of marrying non-Jews

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according to a poll from 2007, more than half of all Israeli Jews believe that intermarriage should be equated with “national treason.”

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/836866159253286912 http://ift.tt/2oqlfPb

“pathological Narcissus” is literally “somebody else” in relation to himself, or in terms of his symbolic identity or identification.

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/836501442059972608 http://ift.tt/2oVcluq

somebody who is socially fully “adjusted” and fully “functional” can, in fact, be psychotic.

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/836140113444941824 http://ift.tt/2okRTBJ

Borderline is a step towards normalisation, a hysterisation, the subject loses all distance, caught up in the paradox of desire/the symbolic

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/835775179791949824 http://ift.tt/2ok0kx0

Borderline is not the breakdown of the mask of the “pathological” Ego, which supposedly maintained the appearance of unity.

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/835411541495250945 http://ift.tt/2ony7WG

[In religion] ‘God’ is ..this Other’s gaze returned by objects, an imagined gaze.. ..This gaze exists only for a desiring subject.

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/835049163452710915 http://ift.tt/2omXWWP

In love ..‘the gaze of the Other remains even if the Other ..ceased to exist.’ The Other’s gaze ‘sees in me more than myself’

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/834688026966126592 http://ift.tt/2obvMf1

How would you defend yourself against charges that you are promoting terrorism or violence? Žižek: Such charges may be a below-the-belt blow

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no era did more to undermine so-called family and community values than the Reagan era

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death drive is this idea of beyond the pleasure principle, self-sabotaging, etc.

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The ongoing disorder should be treated as the true face of the New World Order

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narcissus can be found almost exclusively in families where the “father has been absent” (did not perform his paternal “role”)

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/832920165843079168 http://ift.tt/2p6rogN

The way we are split connects us with others; we look for the missing part in the other. The other fills our own gap.

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This is why moments of crisis are so dangerous, in them appears the obscure violence which sustained [the times fre… https://t.co/8eybHscAhR

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A modest plea for enlightened catastrophism https://t.co/Dz62JgVAyq

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the pathological narcissus is convinced that life is a game, everybody wears a mask and is a criminal hiding behind a conformist appearance

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/832658717736857601 http://ift.tt/2oFIMJJ

individuals can only desire insofar as they become victims of an illusion: they think they desire another person because of him or her

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/832648625192734720 http://ift.tt/2nQTIEh

the impossibility of sexual relationship is covered up by the sexualized cosmo-ontology of masculine and feminine principle

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The true site of my beliefs is not my conscious acts, but the unconscious.

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/832512449408598016 http://ift.tt/2n2BgLO

They are not aware that their desire is caused by the essence/odour which has nothing to do with the person as such. Since Grenouille can bypass the person and directly target the object-cause of desire, he can avoid this illusion - this is why eroticism is for him a ridiculous game of lures. The price he pays for it, however, is that he cannot ever accept the inverse illusion that someone loves him: he is always aware that it is not him but his perfume that makes people adore him

SLAVOJ ZIZEK on the film The Perfume http://ift.tt/2o034zO

One should avoid the trap of putting the blame on patriarchal authority as such, seeing in Fritzl’s monstrosity the ultimate consequence of paternal Law, as well as the opposite trap of putting the blame on the disintegration of paternal Law.

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it is misleading, even outright wrong, to describe Fritzl as ‘inhuman’ - if anything, he was, to use Nietzsche’s phrase, 'human, all too human’. No wonder Fritzl complained that his own life had been 'ruined’ by the discovery of his secret family. What makes his reign so chilling is precisely the way his brutal exercise of power and his usufruit Fritzl claimed that he noted Elisabeth wanted to escape her home - she was returning home late, looking for a job, had a boyfriend, was possibly taking drugs, and he wanted to protect her from all that The contours of the obsessional strategy are clearly recognizable here: 'III protect her from the dangers of the outside world even if it means destroying her’. According to the media, Fritzl defended himself thus: If it weren’t for me, Kerstin wouldn’t be alive today, f m no monster. I could have killed them all. Then there would have been no trace. No one would have found me out’ What is crucial here is the underlying premiss: as a father, he had the right to exercise total power

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