Saturday, 30 December 2017

Sunday, 24 December 2017

Saturday, 23 December 2017

Friday, 22 December 2017

Thursday, 21 December 2017

Wednesday, 20 December 2017

Monday, 18 December 2017

Saturday, 18 November 2017

The hysteric is horrified at being..the object of others

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/925646114367442945 http://ift.tt/2yWPQGF

Friday, 10 November 2017

the way to confront anxiety is to transform ourselves.

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/922736959688200192 http://ift.tt/2ysatuj

Thursday, 9 November 2017

Sunday, 5 November 2017

Thursday, 2 November 2017

Putin’s foreign policy is a clear continuation of this tsarist-Stalinist line. According to him, after the Revolution, it was the turn of the Bolsheviks to aggrieve Russia: ‘The Bolsheviks, for a number of reasons – may God judge them – added large sections of the historical South of Russia to the Republic of Ukraine. This was done with no consideration for the ethnic makeup of the population, and today these areas form the southeast of Ukraine.’10 In January 2016, Putin again made the same point in his characterisation of Lenin’s greatest mistake: Ruling with your ideas as a guide is correct, but that is only the case when that idea leads to the right results, not like it did with Vladimir Ilyich. In the end that idea led to the ruin of the Soviet Union. There were many of these ideas such as providing regions with autonomy, and so on. They planted an atomic bomb under the building that is called Russia and which would later explode.11 In short, Lenin was guilty of taking seriously the autonomy of the different nations that composed the Russian empire, and thus of questioning Russian hegemony. No wonder we see portraits of Stalin again during Russian military parades and public celebrations, while Lenin is obliterated. In a big opinion poll conducted a couple of years ago, Stalin was voted the third-greatest Russian of all time, while Lenin was nowhere to be seen. Stalin is not celebrated today as a communist, but as the restorer of Russia’s greatness after Lenin’s anti-patriotic ‘deviation’. For Lenin, ‘proletarian internationalism’ goes hand in hand with a defence of the rights of small nations against the big nations: for a ‘great’ nation dominating others, giving full rights to smaller nations is the key indicator of the seriousness of their professed internationalism.

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Friday, 27 October 2017

Thursday, 26 October 2017

Monday, 23 October 2017

Wednesday, 18 October 2017

Nazism was an impotent acting-out which, ultimately, remained in the service of the very order it despised. Zizek https://t.co/OBtvzRUAmH

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/916215234645364736 http://ift.tt/2il9LLS

instead of ‘winning’ (taking power) one maintains a distance towards state power, one creates spaces subtracted from the state. But is this solution really adequate? What about heroically accepting the risk of self-obliteration? A revolutionary process is not a well-planned strategic activity with no place for a full immersion in the Now without regard for the long-term consequences. Quite the contrary: the suspension of all strategic considerations based upon the hope for a better future is a key part of any revolutionary process

http://ift.tt/2kXiAMX

if subjectivity is afraid not so much to fight but to win, it is because struggle exposes it to a simple failure (the attack didn’t succeed), while victory exposes it to the most fearsome form of failure: the awareness that one won in vain, that victory prepares repetition, restoration. That a revolution is never more than a between-two-States. It is from here that the sacrificial temptation of the void comes. The most fearsome enemy of the politics of emancipation is not repression by the established order. It is the interiority of nihilism, and the cruelty without limits which can accompany its void

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Is not the basic experience of the end of Really Existing Socialism precisely the rejection of this shared feature, the resigned ‘postmodern’ acceptance of the fact that society is a complex network of ‘sub-systems’, which is why a certain level of ‘alienation’ is constitutive of social life, so that a totally self-transparent society is a utopia replete with totalitarian potential?

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Tuesday, 17 October 2017

Monday, 16 October 2017

there is nothing sublime in sacred; Nazi parades were also sacred.

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/915482907904561152 http://ift.tt/2yuD30T

Saturday, 14 October 2017

there is nothing sublime, really great in sacred

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/914763161798156288 http://ift.tt/2xFUyqM

Tuesday, 10 October 2017

the message is “You may enjoy, but because you may, you must”.

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/913316136250470400 http://ift.tt/2ze6rGK

Monday, 9 October 2017

Tuesday, 3 October 2017

Monday, 2 October 2017

In every crisis, Putin let the ordinary people suffer to the end

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/911504187304873984 http://ift.tt/2xbv1pv

Saturday, 23 September 2017

Saturday, 9 September 2017

Wednesday, 6 September 2017

Saturday, 2 September 2017

Thursday, 31 August 2017

if we get too near the object, it loses its sublime features

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/900263867800068096 http://ift.tt/2eIy2H7

Wednesday, 30 August 2017

Tuesday, 29 August 2017

Monday, 28 August 2017

Sunday, 27 August 2017

belief is embodied in our very social practice.

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/898816969742397441 http://ift.tt/2wTRhrh

Friday, 25 August 2017

the external Master is replaced with an internal one. The price for this identification is, of course, the sacrifice of all “pathological” particular content—duty should be accomplished “for the sake of duty.” …Reality reaches its truth only through/in its self-destruction; unlike Christianity, Hegel is well aware that there is no Other World in which we will be repaid for our terrestrial losses: transcendence is absolutely immanent, what is “beyond” finite reality is nothing but the immanent process of its self-overcoming . Hegel’s name for this absolute immanence of transcendence is “absolute negativity,” as he makes clear in an exemplary way in the dialectics of Master and Servant: the Servant’s secure particular/finite identity is unsettled when, in experiencing the fear of death during his confrontation with the Master, he gets a whiff of the infinite power of negativity; through this experience, the Servant is forced to accept the worthlessness of his particular Self… …What, then, does the Servant get in exchange for renouncing all the wealth of his particular Self? Nothing —in overcoming his particular terrestrial Self, the Servant does not reach a higher level of a spiritual Self; all he has to do is to shift his position and recognize in (what appears to him as) the overwhelming power of destruction which threatens to obliterate his particular identity the absolute negativity which forms the very core of his own Self. In short, the subject has to fully identify with the force that threatens to wipe him out: what he feared in fearing death was the negative power of his own Self. There is thus no reversal of negativity into positive greatness—the only “greatness” here is this negativity itself. Or, with regard to suffering: Hegel’s point is not that the suffering brought about by the alienating labor of renunciation is an intermediary moment that must be patiently endured while we wait for our reward at the end of the tunnel—there is no prize or profit to be gained at the end for our patient submission; suffering and renunciation are their own reward, all that has to be done is to change our subjective position, to renounce our desperate clinging to our finite Selves with their “pathological” desires, to purify our Selves towards their universality. …Hegelian “negativity” serves to “proscribe absolute difference” or “non-being”:8 negativity is limited to the obliteration of all finite/immediate determinations. The process of negativity is thus not just a negative process of the self-destruction of the finite: it reaches its telos when finite/immediate determinations are mediated/maintained/elevated, posited in their “truth” as ideal notional determinations. What remains after negativity has done its work is the eternal parousia of the ideal notional structure. What is missing here, from the Nietzschean standpoint, is the affirmative no : the no of the joyous and heroic confrontation with the adversary, the no of struggle which aims at self-assertion, not self-sublation

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Wednesday, 16 August 2017

how do we pass from Revolutionary Terror to Kant’s autonomous and free moral subject? By way of what, in more contemporary language, one could call a full identification with the aggressor: the subject should recognize in the external Terror, in this negativity which constantly threatens to annihilate him, the very core of his (universal) subjectivity; in other words, he should fully identify with it. Freedom is thus not freedom from a Master, but the replacement of one Master with another: the external Master is replaced with an internal one. The price for this identification is, of course, the sacrifice of all “pathological” particular content—duty should be accomplished “for the sake of duty.” …when one talks, one always dwells in the universal—which means that, with its entry into language, the subject loses its roots in the concrete life world. To put it in more pathetic terms, the moment I start to talk, I am no longer the sensually concrete I, since I am caught up in an impersonal mechanism which always makes me say something different from what I wanted to say—as the early Lacan liked to say, I am not speaking, I am being spoken by language. This is one way to understand what Lacan called “symbolic castration”: the price the subject pays for its “transubstantiation” from being the agent of a direct animal vitality to being a speaking subject whose identity is kept apart from the direct vitality of passions. A Nietzschean reading easily discerns in this reversal of Terror into autonomous morality a desperate strategy of turning defeat into triumph: instead of heroically fighting for one’s vital interests, one pre-emptively declares total surrender and gives up all content. Lebrun is here well aware how unjustified the standard critique of Hegel is according to which the dialectical reversal of utter negativity into a new higher positivity, of catastrophe into triumph, functions as a kind of deus ex machina , precluding the possibility that the catastrophe might be the final outcome of the process—the well-known common-sense argument: “But what if there is no reversal of negativity into a new positive order?” This argument misses the point, which is that this is, precisely, what happens in the Hegelian reversal: there is no real reversal of defeat into triumph but only a purely formal shift, a change of perspective, which tries to present defeat itself as a triumph. Nietzsche’s point is that this triumph is a fake, a cheap magician’s trick, a consolation prize for losing all that makes life worth living: the real loss of vitality is supplemented by a lifeless specter. In Lebrun’s Nietzschean reading, Hegel thus appears as a kind of atheist Christian philosopher: like Christianity, he locates the “truth” of all terrestrial finite reality in its (self-)annihilation—reality reaches its truth only through/in its self-destruction; unlike Christianity, Hegel is well aware that there is no Other World in which we will be repaid for our terrestrial losses: transcendence is absolutely immanent, what is “beyond” finite reality is nothing but the immanent process of its self-overcoming . Hegel’s name for this absolute immanence of transcendence is “absolute negativity,” as he makes clear in an exemplary way in the dialectics of Master and Servant: the Servant’s secure particular/finite identity is unsettled when, in experiencing the fear of death during his confrontation with the Master, he gets a whiff of the infinite power of negativity; through this experience, the Servant is forced to accept the worthlessness of his particular Self… …What, then, does the Servant get in exchange for renouncing all the wealth of his particular Self? Nothing —in overcoming his particular terrestrial Self, the Servant does not reach a higher level of a spiritual Self; all he has to do is to shift his position and recognize in (what appears to him as) the overwhelming power of destruction which threatens to obliterate his particular identity the absolute negativity which forms the very core of his own Self. In short, the subject has to fully identify with the force that threatens to wipe him out: what he feared in fearing death was the negative power of his own Self. There is thus no reversal of negativity into positive greatness—the only “greatness” here is this negativity itself. Or, with regard to suffering: Hegel’s point is not that the suffering brought about by the alienating labor of renunciation is an intermediary moment that must be patiently endured while we wait for our reward at the end of the tunnel—there is no prize or profit to be gained at the end for our patient submission; suffering and renunciation are their own reward, all that has to be done is to change our subjective position, to renounce our desperate clinging to our finite Selves with their “pathological” desires, to purify our Selves towards their universality. This is also how Hegel explains the overcoming of tyranny in the history of states: “One says that tyranny is overturned by the people because it is undignified, shameful, etc. In reality, it disappears simply because it is superfluous.”7 It becomes superfluous when people no longer need the external force of the tyrant to make them renounce their particular interests, but when they become “universal citizens” by directly identifying the core of their being with this universality—in short, people no longer need the external master when they are educated into doing the job of discipline and subordination themselves. The obverse of Hegel’s “nihilism” (all finite/determinate forms of life reach their “truth” in their self-overcoming) is its apparent opposite: in continuity with the Platonic metaphysical tradition, he is not ready to give negativity full rein, that is, his dialectics is ultimately an effort to “normalize” the excess of negativity. For late Plato already, the problem was how to relativize or contextualize non-being as a subordinate moment of being (non-being is always a particular/determinate lack of being measured by the fullness it fails to actualize; there is no non-being as such, there is always only, e.g., “green” which participates in non-being by not being “red” or any other color, etc.). In the same vein, Hegelian “negativity” serves to “proscribe absolute difference” or “non-being”:8 negativity is limited to the obliteration of all finite/immediate determinations. The process of negativity is thus not just a negative process of the self-destruction of the finite: it reaches its telos when finite/immediate determinations are mediated/maintained/elevated, posited in their “truth” as ideal notional determinations. What remains after negativity has done its work is the eternal parousia of the ideal notional structure. What is missing here, from the Nietzschean standpoint, is the affirmative no : the no of the joyous and heroic confrontation with the adversary, the no of struggle which aims at self-assertion, not self-sublation

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we invent, as a protective web, trauma itself. Now, we would normally expect that.. life would be the trauma and we build a fantasy to shield ourselves from it. But perhaps the trauma is the fantasy we construct to protect ourselves from something else.

http://ift.tt/2v279U7

Tuesday, 15 August 2017

the working over of animal instincts—the drive is not instinct but its “denaturalization.” There is, however, a deeper logic to this paradox: from within the established human universe of meaning, its own founding gesture is invisible, indiscernible from its opposite, so that it has to appear as its opposite. This, in simple terms, is the basic difference between psychoanalysis and Christianity: while both agree that the life of the “human animal” is disrupted by the violent intrusion of a properly meta-physical “immortal” dimension, psychoanalysis identifies this dimension as that of (specifically [in]human) sexuality, of the “undead” drive as opposed to the animal instinct, while Christianity sees in sexuality the very force which drags humans towards animality and prevents their access to immortality. Such is the unbearable “news” of psychoanalysis: not its emphasis on the role of sexuality as such, but its rendering visible the “meta-physical” dimension of human sexuality. The paradox of Christianity is that, in order to uphold its edifice, it has to violently suppress this meta-physical dimension of sexuality, to reduce it to animality. In other words, this violent de-spiritualization of the key dimension of being-human is the “truth” of the Christian elevation of human spirituality. Unfortunately, Hegel does the same in his theory of marriage—as does Heidegger too. The standard idealist question “Is there (eternal) life after death?” should be countered by the materialist question: “Is there life before death?” This is the question Wolf Biermann asked in one of his songs—what bothers a materialist is: am I really alive here and now, or am I just vegetating, as a mere human animal bent on survival? When am I really alive? Precisely when I enact the “undead” drive in me, the “too-much-ness” of life. And I reach this point when I no longer act directly, but when “it” ( es )—whose Christian name is the Holy Spirit—acts through me. At this point, I reach the Absolute. The next, and crucial, step is to see how this “stuckness” is not just a consequence of our human deficiency or finitude, of our inability to grasp pure Being from our partial perspective (if it were, then the solution would lie in a kind of Oriental self-effacement, an immersion in the primordial Void); rather, this “stuckness” bears witness to a strife at the very heart of Being itself. Deeply pertinent here is Gregory Fried’s reading of Heidegger’s entire opus through the interpretive lense of his reference to Heraclitus’s polemos (struggle—in German, Krieg , Kampf , or, predominantly in Heidegger, Auseinandersetzung ) from the latter’s famous fragment 53: “War is both father of all and king of all: it reveals the gods on the one hand and humans on the other, makes slaves on the one hand, the free on the other.”32 It is not only that the stable identity of each entity is temporary, that they all sooner or later disappear, disintegrate, return to the primordial chaos; their (temporary) identity itself emerges through struggle, for stable identity is something that must be gained through an ordeal—even “class struggle” is already present here, in the guise of the war which “makes slaves on the one hand, the free on the other.” There is, however, a further step to be taken with regard to polemos : it is easy to posit struggle as “father of all” and then elevate this struggle itself into a higher harmony, in the sense that Being becomes the hidden concord of the struggling poles, like a cosmic music in which the opposites harmoniously echo each other. So, to put it bluntly, is this strife part of the Harmony itself, or is it a more radical discord, one which derails the very Harmony of Being? As Davis perceptively notes, Heidegger is ambiguous here, oscillating between the radically open “strife” of Being and its reinscription into the teleological reversal of Danger into Saving in which, as Jean-Luc Nancy put it, “‘discord’ is at best what makes ‘unity appear’”

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the Christian attitude to Christ’s death is not one of melancholic attachment to his deceased person, but one of infinite joy

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/897368545289539584 http://ift.tt/2uGxY52

Monday, 14 August 2017

Wednesday, 9 August 2017

in Christianity God profanes himself

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/895193093342973952 http://ift.tt/2vk8wRf

Tuesday, 8 August 2017

Wednesday, 2 August 2017

Richard II proves beyond any doubt that Shakespeare had read Lacan

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/892653726028230656 http://ift.tt/2vjzaus

Monday, 31 July 2017

Friday, 23 June 2017

the non‐existing pure Gaze of the big Other…is the gaze for which, on ancient Roman aqueducts, the details were carved on the reliefs at the top, invisible to any human eye; the gaze for which the ancient Incas made their gigantic drawings out of stones whose form could be seen only from high up in the air; the gaze for which the Stalinists organized their gigantic public spectacles.

http://ift.tt/2s5fVPN

“The objet a is … of the subject’s desire … it is not simply an objective property of the beloved—that X which fascinates me in the beloved exists only for me, not for an “objective” view. … the status of that which makes me desire an object is irreducibly linked to my “subjective” perspective … far from simply standing for the excess in the object eluding the subject’s grasp, the objet a is … his or her desire for me … what eludes me in a libidinal object is not some transcendent property, but the inscription into it of my own desire … in desire … the aspiration to fullness is transferred to partial objects … the drive is not an infinite longing for the Thing,” not the getting “fixated onto a partial object—the “drive” is this fixation itself in which resides the “death” dimension of every drive,” Zizek says

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Wednesday, 21 June 2017

Thursday, 8 June 2017

Hysteria is questioning the identity imposed.

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/864031417067593728 http://ift.tt/2r7nUjG

deprived of my symbolic identity, I am no one’s and nameless.

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/863666474602434560 http://ift.tt/2sjS1nC

Friday, 2 June 2017

Today, the old joke more appropriate then ever: I am such a tender person that I cannot stand seeing people suffering

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/859677702449659904 http://ift.tt/2rAWwcI

such traumatic encounters, such penetrations into the forbidden or damned domain, in Antigone , are called ate , and can only be sustained for a brief moment. These authentic moments are rare; one can only survive them if one soon returns to the safe domain of semblances—truth is too painful to be sustained for more than a passing moment. At other times (especially in his ruminations about the symptom towards the end of his life), Lacan adopts the opposite (but effectively complementary) attitude of wisdom: the analyst never knows what will happen when he pushes analysis too far and dissolves the analysand’s symptoms too radically—one can get more than one expected, a local interpretive intervention into a particular symptomal formation can destabilize the subject’s entire symbolic economy and bring about a catastrophic disintegration of his world. The analyst should thus remain modest and respect appearances without taking them too seriously; they are ultimately all we have, all that stands between us and the catastrophe. It is easy to see how these two stances complement each other: they rely on a (rather Heideggerian) image of human life as a continuous dwelling in “inauthentic” semblances, interrupted from time to time by violent encounters with the Real. (What this entire field encompassing the two stances excludes is the Christian “work of love,” the patient work of continuous fidelity to the encounter with the Real.) This modest approach of merely “making life a little bit easier,” of diminishing suffering and pain, forgetting about capitalized Truth, makes the late Lacan almost a Rortyan

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Sunday, 28 May 2017

Sunday, 21 May 2017

the subject endorses the loss, re-inscribes it as its triumph. Reconciliation is thus simultaneously both less and more than the standard idea of overcoming an antagonism: less, because nothing “really changes”; more, because the subject of the process is deprived of its very (particular) substance.

http://ift.tt/2rrgTcQ

inner Spirit, certain of itself, “no longer needs to form/shape nature and to render it spiritual in order to fixate the divine and to make its unity with nature externally visible: insofar as the free thought thinks externality, it can leave it the way it is ( kann er es lassen wie es ist ).” This sudden retroactive reversal from not-yet to already-is (we never directly realize a goal—we pass from striving to realize a goal to a sudden recognition that it is already realized) is what distinguishes Hegel from all kinds of historicist tropes, including the standard Marxist critical reproach that the Hegelian ideal reconciliation is insufficient, since it leaves reality (real pain and suffering) the way it is, and that what is needed is actual reconciliation through radical social transformation. For Hegel, the illusion is not that of the enforced “false reconciliation” which ignores the persisting divisions; the true illusion resides in not seeing that, in what appears to us as the chaos of becoming, the infinite goal is already realized : “Within the finite order, we cannot experience or see that the goal is truly achieved. The accomplishment of the infinite goal resides only in overcoming the illusion [ Täuschung— deception] that this goal is not yet achieved.”15 In short, the ultimate deception lies in the failure to see that one already has what one is looking for—like Christ’s disciples awaiting his “real” reincarnation, blind to the fact that their collective already was the Holy Spirit

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Saturday, 20 May 2017

in Hegel’s philosophy, the fundamental stance of the subject towards objective reality is not that of practical engagement, of confrontation with the inertia of objectivity, but that of letting-it-be: purified of its pathological particularity, the universal subject is certain of itself, it knows that its thought already is the form of reality, so it can renounce enforcing its projects upon reality, it can let reality be the way it is. This is why my labor gets all the more close to its truth the less I work to satisfy my need, that is, to produce objects I will consume. This is why industry which produces for the market is spiritually “higher” than production for one’s own needs: in market-production, I manufacture objects with no relation to my needs. The highest form of social production is therefore that of a merchant : “the merchant is the only one who relates to the Good as a perfect universal subject, since the object in no way interests him on behalf of its aesthetic presence or its use value, but only insofar as it contains a desire of an other.”12 And this is also why, in order to arrive at the “truth” of labor, one should gradually abstract from the (external) goal it strives to realize. The parallel with war is appropriate here: in the same way that the “truth” of the military struggle is not the destruction of the enemy, but the sacrifice of the “pathological” content of the warrior’s particular Self, its purification into the universal Self, the “truth” of labor as the struggle with nature is also not victory over nature, compelling it to serve human goals, but the self-purification of the laborer itself. Labor is simultaneously the (trans)formation of external objects and the disciplinary self-formation/education ( Bildung ) of the subject itself. Hegel here celebrates precisely the alienated and alienating character of labor: far from being a direct expression of my creativity, labor forces me to submit to artificial discipline, to renounce my innermost immediate tendencies, to alienate myself from my natural Self

(via lacanians) http://ift.tt/2qGe0UM

Hegel was fully aware that reconciliation does not alleviate real suffering and antagonisms—his formula from the foreword to his Philosophy of Right is that one should “recognize the Rose in the Cross of the present”; or, to put it in Marx’s terms: in reconciliation one does not change external reality to fit some Idea, one recognizes this Idea as the inner “truth” of the miserable reality itself. The Marxist reproach that, instead of transforming reality, Hegel merely proposes a new interpretation of it, thus in a way misses the point—it is knocking on an open door, since, for Hegel, in order to pass from alienation to reconciliation, we do not have to change reality, but rather the way we perceive and relate to it.

http://ift.tt/2rE3xX3

Friday, 19 May 2017

Lacan is actually much closer to Kafka than to the poststructuralists. It has become a cliché to see Kafka as the “writer of absence” who described a world whose structure remained religious, but where the central space reserved for God is empty. … “the Other does not exist” (Lacan),… it does not exist as Guarantor of truth

http://ift.tt/2r1wmAp

“Absolute Knowledge” is divisive AK is in no way a position of “total knowledge,” a position from which, at long last, the subject could finally “know everything.” We must take into account the exact place at which the idea of AK emerges, the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit, the point when the consciousness “de-fetishizes” itself and thus gains the ability to access true knowledge, knowledge instead of truth, and therefore “science” in the Hegelian sense. As such, AK is just a “scilicet,” a “you can know” that opens the space for the development of science (logic, etc.). What does the fetish represent at its core? An object that fills the constitutive lack in the Other, the empty space of the “original repression,” the place where the signifier must be missing in order for the signifying network to articulate itself. In this sense, “de-fetishization” is equivalent to the experience of the constitutive lack in the Other, the Other as barred. Perhaps de-fetishization is even more difficult to accomplish because the fetish reverses the traditional relationship between the “sign” and the “thing.” We normally understand the “sign” as something that represents, replaces, the missing object. When the fetish is an object, it is a thing that replaces the missing “sign.” It is easy to detect absence, the structure of co-referential signifiers, where we thought there was the full presence of a thing, but it is much harder to detect the inert presence of an object in the place where we thought there were only “signs,” an interplay of representations referring back to each other, nothing more than traces. This is why we must take care to differentiate Lacan from any so-called “poststructuralist” tradition whose objective is to “deconstruct” the “metaphysics of presence,” to deny the possibility of full presence, to see only the traces of absence, to dissolve fixed identity into a cluster of references and traces … Lacan is actually much closer to Kafka than to the poststructuralists. It has become a cliché to see Kafka as the “writer of absence” who described a world whose structure remained religious, but where the central space reserved for God is empty. But this is not where it ends; it remains to be shown how this Absence itself conceals an inert, nightmarish presence, an obscene superego object, the “Supremely-Evil-Being.” It is from this perspective that we must reinterpret the two features of AK that initially seem to possess a certain kind of “idealistic” resonance: AK as the “abolition of the object,” in which it does away with objectivity as outside the subject and opposed to it, and AK as the abolition of the Other, removing the dependence of the subject on an instance that is external and de-centered. Hegelian “sublation of the Other” is in no way equivalent to a fusion of the subject with its other, in which the subject appropriates the substantial contents. Rather, we should understand it as a specifically Hegelian way of saying “the Other does not exist” (Lacan), that it does not exist as Guarantor of truth, the Other of the Other, and that therefore we must posit a lack in the Other, that the Other is barred.

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Thursday, 18 May 2017

Would it not be possible to determine the final moment of the analytical process, the pass, as the experience of the positive character of the loss, of the initial emptiness filled by the dazzling and fascinating phantasy object – experiencing the realization that the object as such is fundamentally the positivization of an emptiness? Isn’t this experience of the primacy of the place over the phantasy object the traversal of the phantasy, the moment in which, to quote Mallarmé, “nothing takes place except the place”? This is why it is so important to completely differentiate the pass from “resignation,” from “giving up”; from this perspective, analysis would be finished when the analysand “acquiesced to his symbolic castration,” resigning himself to the fact that radical Loss is part of the condition of the being-of-language [parlêtre]. This kind of interpretation turns Lacan into some kind of “wise guru” who preaches “total renunciation.” It may initially seem as if there is a lot of evidence for this interpretation. Isn’t the Phantasy fundamentally the Phantasy of the sexual rapport finally become possible, finally fully realizable? And isn’t the end of the analysis, the traversal of the Phantasy, simply experiencing the realization of the impossibility of the sexual rapport, and therefore the irreconcilably blocked, knotted, failed nature of the “human condition”? But nothing of the kind is true. If we posit as the fundamental ethical principle of analysis “not to give up on one’s desire” – from which it follows that the symptom is, as Jacques-Alain Miller pointed out, precisely a specific mode of “giving up one’s desire” – we must determine the pass as the moment in which the subject takes on his own desire in its pure, “non-pathological,” form, beyond its historicalness/hystericalness. The best example of a “post-analytic” subject is not the dubious figure of a “wise guru,” but rather Oedipus at Colonus, a grumpy old man who asks for everything, who does not want to give up anything. If the traversal of the phantasy is tied to the experience of some kind of lack, this lack is the Other’s and not that of the subject himself. In the pass, the subject undergoes the realization that the agalma, the “hidden treasure,” is already missing from the Other, the object separates itself from the I – the signifying trait in the Other. After the subject has been placed in relation to the object a, “the experience of the fundamental phantasy becomes the drive. What, then, does he who has passed through the experience of this opaque relation to the origin, to the drive, become? How can a subject who has traversed the radical phantasy experience the drive? This is the beyond of analysis, and has never been approached. Up to now, it has been approachable only at the level of the analyst, in as much as it would be required of him to have specifically traversed the cycle of the analytic experience in its totality”. (Lacan 1998a: 273) Isn’t the incessant drive of Hegelian “Absolute Knowledge [AK]” [“savoir absolu [SA]”], the infinitely repeated journey down the already traveled path, the ultimate example of how to “live one’s drive” once history/hysteria are gone? It is no surprise, then, to see Lacan, in Chapter XIV of Seminar XI, articulating the circuit of drive in terms that directly evoke the Hegelian distinction between the “finite” end and the “infinite” end. Lacan makes use of a distinction in the English language between aim and goal (cf. 1998a: 179). The circuit of drive can be determined specifically as the back and forth between aim and goal. Drive is, initially, a path toward a particular goal, and then it becomes the experience that its true goal is the same thing as the path itself, that its “goal is nothing more than turning around in circles”

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the Hegelian “loss of the loss” is in no way a return to full, lossless, identity. Far from it, the “loss of the loss” is precisely the moment when the loss stops being the loss of “something” and becomes the inauguration of an empty space in which the object (“something”) can survive, the moment when the empty space is recognized as pre-dating its contents – the loss opens the space for the arrival of the object. In the “loss of the loss,” the loss remains a loss; it is not “abolished/canceled” in the ordinary sense of the term. The recuperated “positivity” is that of the loss as loss, the experience of the loss as a “positive” – perhaps even “productive” – condition

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Wednesday, 17 May 2017

It is through the very thing that initially seemed to exclude us from the Other – our question through which we came to see the Other as enigmatic, inaccessible, transcendent – that brings us together with the Other, because this question is the Other’s question, because the substance is the subject (let us not forget that the thing that defines the subject is the very question itself). Would it not therefore be possible to base Hegelian “dis-alienation” on Lacanian separation? Lacan defined separation as the superimposition of two lacks (cf. Lacan 1998a: 214); when the subject encounters the lack in the Other, he responds with a pre-existing lack, his own lack. In the process of alienation, the subject is confronted with a full, substantial Other, in whose depths there supposedly lies a “secret,” an unreachable treasure. “Dis-alienation,” therefore, has nothing to do with appropriating this secret; the subject never finally pierces into the Other’s hidden core – far from it, the subject simply experiences that this “hidden treasure” (agalma, the object-cause of desire) is already missing from the Other herself. “Dis-alienation” can be reduced to the act through which the subject perceives that the Other’s substantial secret is also a secret for the Other, in other words, the experience of a separation between the Other and its “secret,” the object little a.

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truth is the same thing as the path to itself. A Pole and a Jew are sitting in the same carriage in a train. Something is bothering the Pole and he keeps fidgeting in his seat. Finally, he can’t hold it in any longer and blurts out: “Tell me how it is that you Jews are able to get so rich by bleeding people down to their last cent?” The Jew answers: “Okay, I’ll tell you, but I won’t do it for free. Give me five zlotys.” After pocketing the coins, he begins: “First, you have to take a dead fish, cut off its head, and pour its guts into a glass of water. Then, when the moon is full, you bury this glass in a graveyard.” “And,” the Pole asks greedily, “if I do that I’ll be rich?” “Not so fast,” the Jew replies; “there is more to it, but if you want to hear the rest you’ll need to give me five more zlotys.” The money is exchanged and the Jew continues his story, soon asks for more money, etc., up until the Pole finally explodes: “You cheat! You think I’m not on to you? There’s no secret, you just want to take all my money!” The Jew calmly replies: “There you go, now you understand how the Jews …” Every aspect of this little story is worth interpreting, starting with the very beginning. The fact that the Pole can’t stop looking over at the Jew means that he is already in the process of transferring onto the Jew; for him the Jew embodies the subject who supposedly knows (the secret of how to extract every last cent from people). The fundamental lesson is that ultimately the Jew did not trick the Pole: he kept his word, he fulfilled his part of the deal by showing him how Jews, etc., etc. The decisive twist takes place in the gap between the moment in which the Pole gets angry and the Jew gives his final answer. When the Pole explodes, he is already speaking the truth, he just doesn’t know it yet. He sees how the Jew took his money from him, but he only considers this to be some kind of Jewish trick. To put this in topological terms, he does not yet see that he’s already passed onto the other surface of the Möbius strip, that the trick itself contains the answer to the initial question, given that the reason he paid the Jew was precisely to teach him the way in which Jews … The mistake lies in the Pole’s perspective; he was waiting for the Jew’s secret to be revealed at the end of the story. He thought that the story the Jew was telling was just a path toward the final secret. His fixation on the hidden Secret, the final point of the narrative chain, blinded him as to the true secret, which was the way in which he was tricked by the Jew’s story about said secret. The Jew’s “secret” lies in the Pole’s desire, and therefore our own desire; it lies in the fact that the Jew knows how to make use of our desires. This is why the conclusion of this little story corresponds perfectly to the final moment of analysis, the exit from the transfer and the traversal of the phantasy, the two stages of which are split between the final two moments of the joke’s denouement. The Pole’s explosion of anger marks the point where he exits the transfer, where he realizes that “there is no secret” and thus the Jew ceases to be the “subject who supposedly knows.” The Jew’s final comment articulates the traversal of the phantasy. Isn’t the “secret” that causes us to follow the Jew’s story so attentively the object a, the chimerical “thing” of phantasy that provokes our desire, all while being retroactively posited by the desire itself? In this sense, the traversal of the phantasy coincides precisely with the experience that the object, the pure semblant, does nothing more than positivize the hole in our desire. In addition, this story is also a perfect illustration of the unique and irreplaceable role of money in the analytical process. If the Pole was not paying the Jew for his story, he would not reach the level of anger necessary for him to exit from the transfer. It is puzzling that, as a general rule, we do not recognize the structure of this Witz in another, much more famous, story. I am talking, of course, about the Witz of the entrance to the Law in Chapter IX of Kafka’s The Trial and its final reversal when the man from the country who is waiting asks the guard: “Everyone seeks the Law,” the man says, “so how is it that in all these years no one apart from me has asked to be let in?” The doorkeeper realizes that the man is nearing his end, and so, in order to be audible to his fading hearing, he bellows at him, “No one else could be granted entry here, because this entrance was intended for you alone. I shall now go and shut it.” (Kafka 2009b: 155) This reversal is quite analogous to the twist at the end of the story of the Pole and the Jew. The subject finally understands that he was included in the game from the beginning, that the door was already designed for him alone – in the same way that in the story of the Pole and the Jew, the point of the Jew’s story is, ultimately, just to catch the Pole’s desire. And, I should add, it is the same as in the story from Arabian Nights I mentioned earlier in which the hero’s accidental entrance to the cave turns out to have been long-awaited by the wise men. We could even rework Kafka’s story about the entrance to the Law in a way that would make it all the more similar to the Witz of the Pole and the Jew. Let us imagine that, after a long wait, the man from the country suddenly exploded in anger and started to scream at the guard: “You dirty liar! Why are you pretending to guard the entrance to unknown secrets, when you yourself know that there is not a single secret behind that Door, because that entrance was designed for me alone, it serves only to capture my desire?” – to which the guard would calmly reply: “There you go! You’ve finally discovered the true secret of the entrance to the Law.” In these two cases, the logic of the final twist is strictly Hegelian, functioning similarly to what Hegel called the “sublation of the bad infinity.” Both cases start out the same way: the subject is confronted with an inaccessible, transcendental, substantial truth, a forbidden secret that is infinitely deferred. In one case there is the inaccessible Heart of the Law that lies beyond the infinite series of entrances, in the other there is the inaccessible final answer to the question of how Jews manage to get people to give them all their money down to their last cent (because it is clear from the narrative that the Jew could keep going forever). In both stories, the denouement, the solution, is the same – instead of finally succeeding in lifting the final curtain and unveiling the ultimate secret, the Heart of the Law/the way in which the Jews extract people’s money, the subject realizes that he was included in the game from the very beginning, that his exclusion from the Secret and his desire to learn the Secret were already included in the very way the Secret operated. This reveals the dimension of a certain type of reflexivity that is missed by the classical philosophical conception of reflexivity. Philosophical reflexivity consists in the mediating movement through which the One comes to include its alterity, the Subject appropriates the substantial content opposed to it by positing itself as the unity of itself and its other. But this idea of the positivation of impossibility necessarily implies a whole different kind of reflexive reversal, whose key moment occurs when the subject recognizes that the impossibility of appropriating the Heart of the Other is a positive condition for the definition of his own status as subject

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Tuesday, 16 May 2017

the impossibility of appropriating the Heart of the Other is a positive condition for the definition of his own status as subject. This twist constitutes a radical change in perspective. It is this very failure – the frustration of the subject’s attempt to appropriate the opposed substantial contents in order to penetrate into the Heart of the Other – that includes the subject in the substance, in the Other. This reflexive shift is exactly what we see at the end of Kafka’s “parable” about the Doors of the Law: the man finally understands that the Door that supposedly hid an inaccessible substantial contentwas destined for him alone, that from the very beginning the unreachable Other of the Law was addressed to him, that it had accounted for him from the outset. The other’s lack It would therefore be a mistake to think that the dialectical relationship between Knowledge and Truth is a progressive approach guided by knowledge of the Truth, in which the subject recognizes the “falseness” and insufficiency of some figure of his knowledge, and so progresses to another figure that is closer to the Truth, etc., until finally Knowledge and Truth come together in Absolute Knowledge. In such a perspective, Truth is a substantial entity, an in-Itself, and the dialectical process takes the form of simple asymptotic progress, a gradual approach to the Truth, something along the lines of Victor Hugo’s famous quote: “Science is asymptotic to truth. Ever approaching but never touching it.” The Hegelian conjunction of the truth with the path toward the truth implies, on the contrary, that we are always already in contact with the truth. When knowledge changes, truth itself must change, which is to say that when knowledge does not correspond to the truth, we don’t simply need to accommodate the truth, but in fact transform the two poles – the insufficiency of knowledge, its lack in relation to the truth, indicates that there is always a lack, an incompleteness at the very core of truth itself. We must therefore toss out the traditional conception of the dialectical process as moved forward by particular, limited, and “unilateral” elements that push it toward a final totality. The truth at which we arrive is not “whole,” the question always remains open, it simply becomes a question we ask of the Other

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The hysterical subject is above all the subject who asks himself a question while at the same time presupposing that the Other has the answer, that the Other holds the key. In the dialectical process, this question asked of the Other is resolved through a reflexive turn in which the question begins to function as its own answer

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Sunday, 7 May 2017

The modern name for this Other who is “supposed to believe” in our stead is the “people”. …When Golda Meir was asked whether she believed in God, she said: “I believe in the Jewish people, and the Jewish people believe in God.” This statement …does not imply that the majority of the Jews believe in God. [Meir’s] statement …implies …a certain fetishization of the “people”: even if (to go the extreme) no individual Jewish citizen of Israel believes, each of them presupposes that the “people” believes, and this presupposition is enough to make her act as if she believes. (In Defense of Lost Causes, p227)

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“I myself find it hard to exert such pressure on the poor kids, but what can I do-it’s my duty!” The more pertinent example is that of a Stalinist politician who loves mankind, but nonetheless performs horrible purges and executions; his heart is breaking while he is doing it, but he cannot help it, it’s his Duty towards the Progress of Humanity… What we encounter here is the properly perverse attitude of adopting the position of the pure instrument of the big Other’s Will: it’s not my responsibility, it’s not me who is effectively doing it, I am merely an instrument of the higher Historical Necessity… The obscene jouissance of this situation is generated by the fact that I conceive of myself as exculpated for what I am doing: isn’t it nice to be able to inflict pain on others with the full awareness that I’m not responsible for it, that I merely fulfill the Other’s Will…this is what Kantian ethics prohibits. …at its most radical, Kantian ethics is NOT “sadist,” but precisely what prohibits assuming the position of a Sadean executioner.

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Friday, 5 May 2017

Crucial to Buddhism is the reflexive change from the object to the thinker himself: first, we isolate the thing that bothers us, the cause of our suffering; then we change not the object but ourselves, the way we relate to (what appears to us as) the cause of our suffering: “What was extinguished was only the false view of self. What had always been illusory was understood as such. Nothing was changed but the perspective of the observer.” This shift involves great pain; it is not merely a liberation, a step into the incestuous bliss of the infamous “oceanic feeling”; it is also the violent experience of losing the ground under one’s feet, of being deprived of the most familiar stage of one’s being. This is why the path towards Buddhist Enlightenment begins by focusing on the most elementary feelings of “injured innocence,” of suffering an injustice without cause (the preferred topic of narcissistic, masochistic thoughts: “How could she do this to me?I don’t deserve to be treated that way”). The next step is to make the shift to the Ego itself, the subject of these painful emotions, rendering clear and palpable its own fleeting and irrelevant status—the aggression directed against the object causing the suffering should be turned against the Self itself. We do not repair the damage; rather, we gain the insight into the illusory nature of that which appears to need repair. …On the one side, reality remains as it is, nothing changes, it is just fully perceived as what it is, a mere insubstantial flow of phenomena that does not really affect the void at the core of our being; on the other side, the goal is to transform reality itself so that there will be no suffering in it, so that all living beings will enter nirvana.

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I am, of course, fundamentally anti-capitalist. But let’s not have any illusions here. No. What shocks me is that most of the critics of today’s capitalism feel even embarrassed, that’s my experience, when you confront them with a simple question, “Okay, we heard your story … protest horrible, big banks depriving us of billions, hundreds, thousands of billions of common people’s money… . Okay, but what do you really want? What should replace the system?” And then you get one big confusion. You get either a general moralistic answer, like “People shouldn’t serve money. Money should serve people.”

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Thursday, 4 May 2017

not only you cannot use your pathological longings as an excuse why you can’t do your duty, for example you cannot say “This is my duty but I will not do it because it may hurt my friend”, you also cannot use duty itself as an excuse do your duty. You cannot say to your friend: “Listen, I must drop you now because it is my ethical duty. I know it hurts you but this is my duty.” Because in this way you already objectify yourself, it is not you. Kant means that duty itself is not an excuse to do your duty. You are fully responsible to formulate what your duty is. This is how I read the categorical imperative — it has the structure of what Kant calls aesthetic judgment. Lyotard developed this very nicely: An aesthetic judgment is not simply an application of pre–existing norms to the situation, in the aesthetic judgment you posit the norms yourself and it is your responsibility. Apropos of a particular situation, you have to reinvent the universality which covers the situation, and as such you are fully responsible for it. When you say: “That is my duty”, you cannot say: “What can I do, it’s my duty.” You fully have to stand behind what your duty is. Now, going back to the materiality of the act. Of course, this definition of the authentic act has an aspect of being almost non–historical, I agree with that. But believe me I am an old–fashioned Marxist, so what I claim is that this notion of act is of special actuality today in our so–called post–modern era, where the predominant ethic, across the entire spectrum of ethical positions, from narcissistic hedonism to neo–fundamentalism or whatever, is an ethic precisely against the ethical act. All these problems of ethical committees, of ethical rules, are always about how to prevent an excess which is precisely the excess of the act. In this sense I claim that it is only today, in today’s so–called permissive society, that society is regulated as no society in history ever was, that such notion of an act was ever elaborated.

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the choice is never simply the one between doing my duty or following my striving for “pathological” pleasures and satisfactions; this elementary choice is always redoubled by the one between elevating my striving for pleasures itself into my supreme Duty, and doing my Duty not for the sake of Duty but because it gives me satisfaction to do it. In the first case pleasures are my duty: the “pathological” striving for pleasures is located into the formal space of Duty; in the second case duty is my pleasure: doing my duty is located in the formal space of “pathological” satisfactions

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Monday, 24 April 2017

NATO is intervening in order to protect the Kosovar victims, it is at the same time well taking care that THEY WILL REMAIN VICTIMS, not an active politico.military force capable of defending itself. The strategy of NATO is thus perverse in the precise Freudian sense of the term: it is itself (co)responsible for the calamity against which it offers itself as a remedy

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The precautionary principle is thoroughly ingrained in the self-conception of Germany and a disregard for it is often met with a general feeling of incomprehension and emotional outrage. what bothers me apropos of the recent comeback of human rights is that they rely on what Nietzsche identified as the moralistic ressentiment and envy: they imply the fake gesture of the disavowed politics, of assuming a ‘moral’, depoliticized stance in order to make a stronger political case. We are dealing here with a perverted version of what, in the good old days of dissidence, Vaclav Havel called the 'power of the powerless’: one manipulates one’s powerlessness as a stratageme in order to gain more power, in exactly the same way that today, in our politically correct times, in order for one’s voice to gain authority, one has to legitimize oneself as being some kind of a (potential or actual) victim of power.

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Sunday, 23 April 2017

What makes us happy is not to get what we want. But to dream about it.

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‘How should we fight racism?’ I said with progressive racism. We should adopt racism. They looked at me like - ‘Are you crazy?’ There is a way to practise - I wouldn’t say racist jokes because precisely they are no longer racist take my own country: till the 80s in ex-Yugoslavia, we all the time exchanged dirty jokes about one and the other nation. And I loved them. But this didn’t function as racist jokes but as a kind of a shared obscenity which meant a way of solidarity. …I meet a guy from Montenegro. …We immediately start to tell to each other dirty jokes about the other and about ourselves. …The standard Montenegro story, Montenegrins are supposed to be lazy and they are an earthquake country. So how does a Montenegro guy masturbate? He digs a hole in the earth, puts the penis in and waits for the earthquake. Because he is too lazy even to - but what I want to say is that this …absolutely wasn’t racism, it was solidarity. The message was: we are not just this, you know, cold, politically correct - ooh, what nice food you have, what nice ethnic dances. I don’t care about your stupid, ethnic dances! I want dirty jokes, you know!

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Saturday, 15 April 2017

Friday, 14 April 2017

the sender always receives from the receiver his own message in reverse form,“ "the repressed always returns,” “the frame itself is always being framed by part of its content,” “we cannot escape the symbolic debt, it always has to be settled,” which are all ultimately variations on the same basic premise that “there is no metalanguage.” So let us begin by explaining the impossibility of metalanguage apropos of the Hegelian figure of the “Beautiful Soul,” deploring the wicked ways of the world from the position of an innocent, impassive victim. The “Beautiful Soul” pretends to speak a pure metalanguage, exempted from the corruption of the world, thereby concealing the way its own moans and groans partake actively in the corruption it denounces. In his “Intervention on Transference,” Lacan relies on the dialectic of the “Beautiful Why Does a Letter Always Arrive at Its Destination? / Soul” to designate the falsity of the hysterical subjective position: “Dora,” Freud’s famous analysand, complains of being reduced to a pure object in a play of intersubjective exchanges (her father is allegedly offering her to Mister K. as if in compensation for his own flirtation with Miss K.), i.e., she presents this exchange as an objective state of things in the face of which she is utterly helpless; Freud’s answer is that the function of this stance of passive victimization by cruel circumstances is just to conceal her complicity and collusion-the square of intersubjective exchanges can only sustain itself insofar as Dora assumes actively her role of victim, of an object of exchange, in other words, insofar as she finds libidinal satisfaction in it, insofar as this very renunciation procures for her a kind of perverse surplus enjoyment. A hysteric continually complains of how he cannot adapt himself to the reality of cruel manipulation, and the psychoanalytic answer to it is not “give up your empty dreams, life is cruel, accept it as it is” but quite the contrary “your moans and groans are false since, by means of them, you are only too well adapted to the reality of manipulation and exploitation:” by playing the role of helpless victim, the hysteric assumes the subjective position which enables him to “blackmail emotionally his environs,” as we would put it in today’s jargon. This answer, in which the “Beautiful Soul” is confronted with how it actually partakes of the wicked ways of the world, closes the circuit of communication: in it, the subject/sender receives from the addressee his own message in its true form, i.e., the true meaning of his moans and groans. In other words, in it, the letter that the subject put into circulation “arrives at its destination,” which was from the very beginning the sender himself: the letter arrives at its destination when the subject is finally forced to assume the true consequences of his activity. This is how Lacan…interpreted the Hegelian dictum about the rationality of the real (“What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational”): the true meaning of the subject’s words or deeds-their reason-is disclosed by their actual consequences, so the subject has no right to shrink back from them and say “But I didn’t mean it!

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The true lost object in melancholy is..desire.

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Thursday, 13 April 2017

We are not finite and self-inconsistent because our activity is always thwarted by external obstacles; we are thwarted by external obstacles because we are finite and inconsistent. In other words, what the subject engaged in a struggle perceives as the enemy, the external obstacle he has to overcome, is the materialization of the subject’s immanent inconsistency: the struggling subject needs the figure of the enemy to sustain the illusion of his own consistency, his very identity hinges on his opposing the enemy, so much so that his (eventual) victory amounts to his own defeat or disintegration. As Hegel likes to put it, in fighting the external enemy, one (unknowingly) fights one’s own essence. So, far from celebrating engaged struggle, Hegel’s point is rather that every embattled position, every taking of sides, has to rely on a necessary illusion (the illusion that, once the enemy is annihilated, I will achieve the full realization of my being). This brings us to what would have been a properly Hegelian notion of ideology: the misapprehension of the condition of possibility (of what is an inherent constituent of your position) as the condition of impossibility (as an obstacle which prevents your full realization)—the ideological subject is unable to grasp how his entire identity hinges on what he perceives as the disturbing obstacle. This notion of ideology is not just an abstract mental exercise: it fits perfectly with fascist anti-Semitism as the most elementary form of ideology—one is even tempted to say: as ideology as such, kat’ exochen . The anti-Semitic figure of the Jew, the foreign intruder who disturbs and corrupts the harmony of the social order, is ultimately a fetishistic objectivization, a stand-in, for the “inconsistency” of the social order itself, for the immanent antagonism (“class struggle”) which generates the dynamic of its instability. Hegel’s interest in the “conflict of the opposites” is thus that of the neutral dialectical observer who discerns the “Cunning of Reason” at work in struggle: a subject engages in struggle, is defeated (as a rule, in his very victory), and this defeat brings him to his truth . We can clearly measure here the distance that separates Hegel from Nietzsche: the innocence of exuberant heroism that Nietzsche wants to resuscitate, the passion of risk, of fully engaging in a struggle, of victory or defeat—these are all absent; the “truth” of the struggle emerges only in and through defeat.

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For such an approach, Hegel remains a profoundly Christian thinker, a nihilist whose basic strategy is to repackage a profound defeat, the withdrawal from life in all its painful vitality, as a triumph of the absolute Subject. That is to say, from the standpoint of the Will to Power, the effective content of the Hegelian process is one long story of defeats and withdrawals, of sacrifices of vital self-assertion: again and again, one has to renounce vital engagement as still too “immediate” and “particular.” Exemplary is here Hegel’s passage from the Revolutionary Terror to the Kantian morality: the utilitarian subject of civil society, the subject who wants to reduce the State to being the guardian of his private safety and well-being, has to be crushed by the Terror of the revolutionary State which can annihilate him at any moment for no reason whatsoever (the subject is not punished for something he has done, for some particular content or act, but for the very fact of being an independent individual opposed to the universal)—this Terror is his “truth.” So how do we pass from Revolutionary Terror to Kant’s autonomous and free moral subject? By way of what, in more contemporary language, one could call a full identification with the aggressor: the subject should recognize in the external Terror, in this negativity which constantly threatens to annihilate him, the very core of his (universal) subjectivity; in other words, he should fully identify with it. Freedom is thus not freedom from a Master, but the replacement of one Master with another: the external Master is replaced with an internal one. The price for this identification is, of course, the sacrifice of all “pathological” particular content—duty should be accomplished “for the sake of duty.” …when one talks, one always dwells in the universal—which means that, with its entry into language, the subject loses its roots in the concrete life world. To put it in more pathetic terms, the moment I start to talk, I am no longer the sensually concrete I, since I am caught up in an impersonal mechanism which always makes me say something different from what I wanted to say—as the early Lacan liked to say, I am not speaking, I am being spoken by language. This is one way to understand what Lacan called “symbolic castration”: the price the subject pays for its “transubstantiation” from being the agent of a direct animal vitality to being a speaking subject whose identity is kept apart from the direct vitality of passions. A Nietzschean reading easily discerns in this reversal of Terror into autonomous morality a desperate strategy of turning defeat into triumph: instead of heroically fighting for one’s vital interests, one pre-emptively declares total surrender and gives up all content. Lebrun is here well aware how unjustified the standard critique of Hegel is according to which the dialectical reversal of utter negativity into a new higher positivity, of catastrophe into triumph, functions as a kind of deus ex machina , precluding the possibility that the catastrophe might be the final outcome of the process—the well-known common-sense argument: “But what if there is no reversal of negativity into a new positive order?” This argument misses the point, which is that this is, precisely, what happens in the Hegelian reversal: there is no real reversal of defeat into triumph but only a purely formal shift, a change of perspective, which tries to present defeat itself as a triumph. Nietzsche’s point is that this triumph is a fake, a cheap magician’s trick, a consolation prize for losing all that makes life worth living: the real loss of vitality is supplemented by a lifeless specter. In Lebrun’s Nietzschean reading, Hegel thus appears as a kind of atheist Christian philosopher: like Christianity, he locates the “truth” of all terrestrial finite reality in its (self-)annihilation—reality reaches its truth only through/in its self-destruction; unlike Christianity, Hegel is well aware that there is no Other World in which we will be repaid for our terrestrial losses: transcendence is absolutely immanent, what is “beyond” finite reality is nothing but the immanent process of its self-overcoming . Hegel’s name for this absolute immanence of transcendence is “absolute negativity,” as he makes clear in an exemplary way in the dialectics of Master and Servant: the Servant’s secure particular/finite identity is unsettled when, in experiencing the fear of death during his confrontation with the Master, he gets a whiff of the infinite power of negativity; through this experience, the Servant is forced to accept the worthlessness of his particular Self… …What, then, does the Servant get in exchange for renouncing all the wealth of his particular Self? Nothing —in overcoming his particular terrestrial Self, the Servant does not reach a higher level of a spiritual Self; all he has to do is to shift his position and recognize in (what appears to him as) the overwhelming power of destruction which threatens to obliterate his particular identity the absolute negativity which forms the very core of his own Self. In short, the subject has to fully identify with the force that threatens to wipe him out: what he feared in fearing death was the negative power of his own Self. There is thus no reversal of negativity into positive greatness—the only “greatness” here is this negativity itself. Or, with regard to suffering: Hegel’s point is not that the suffering brought about by the alienating labor of renunciation is an intermediary moment that must be patiently endured while we wait for our reward at the end of the tunnel—there is no prize or profit to be gained at the end for our patient submission; suffering and renunciation are their own reward, all that has to be done is to change our subjective position, to renounce our desperate clinging to our finite Selves with their “pathological” desires, to purify our Selves towards their universality. This is also how Hegel explains the overcoming of tyranny in the history of states: “One says that tyranny is overturned by the people because it is undignified, shameful, etc. In reality, it disappears simply because it is superfluous.”7 It becomes superfluous when people no longer need the external force of the tyrant to make them renounce their particular interests, but when they become “universal citizens” by directly identifying the core of their being with this universality—in short, people no longer need the external master when they are educated into doing the job of discipline and subordination themselves. The obverse of Hegel’s “nihilism” (all finite/determinate forms of life reach their “truth” in their self-overcoming) is its apparent opposite: in continuity with the Platonic metaphysical tradition, he is not ready to give negativity full rein, that is, his dialectics is ultimately an effort to “normalize” the excess of negativity. For late Plato already, the problem was how to relativize or contextualize non-being as a subordinate moment of being (non-being is always a particular/determinate lack of being measured by the fullness it fails to actualize; there is no non-being as such, there is always only, e.g., “green” which participates in non-being by not being “red” or any other color, etc.). In the same vein, Hegelian “negativity” serves to “proscribe absolute difference” or “non-being”:8 negativity is limited to the obliteration of all finite/immediate determinations. The process of negativity is thus not just a negative process of the self-destruction of the finite: it reaches its telos when finite/immediate determinations are mediated/maintained/elevated, posited in their “truth” as ideal notional determinations. What remains after negativity has done its work is the eternal parousia of the ideal notional structure. What is missing here, from the Nietzschean standpoint, is the affirmative no : the no of the joyous and heroic confrontation with the adversary, the no of struggle which aims at self-assertion, not self-sublation

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Acting out…attempts to attest once ‘innocence…’ to ‘shed the intolerable burdon of guilt’.

http://twitter.com/extimacy/status/837585876565770242 http://ift.tt/2oEoX85

Saturday, 1 April 2017

One should avoid the trap of putting the blame on patriarchal authority as such, seeing in Fritzl’s monstrosity the ultimate consequence of paternal Law, as well as the opposite trap of putting the blame on the disintegration of paternal Law.

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it is misleading, even outright wrong, to describe Fritzl as ‘inhuman’ - if anything, he was, to use Nietzsche’s phrase, 'human, all too human’. No wonder Fritzl complained that his own life had been 'ruined’ by the discovery of his secret family. What makes his reign so chilling is precisely the way his brutal exercise of power and his usufruit Fritzl claimed that he noted Elisabeth wanted to escape her home - she was returning home late, looking for a job, had a boyfriend, was possibly taking drugs, and he wanted to protect her from all that The contours of the obsessional strategy are clearly recognizable here: 'III protect her from the dangers of the outside world even if it means destroying her’. According to the media, Fritzl defended himself thus: If it weren’t for me, Kerstin wouldn’t be alive today, f m no monster. I could have killed them all. Then there would have been no trace. No one would have found me out’ What is crucial here is the underlying premiss: as a father, he had the right to exercise total power

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Thursday, 30 March 2017

Judith Butler pointed out that the Foucauldian ‘body’ as the site of resistance is none other than the Freudian ‘psyche’: paradoxically, ‘body’ is Foucault’s name for the psychic apparatus insofar as it resists the soul’s domination. That is to say, when, in his well-known definition of the soul as the ‘prison of the body’, Foucault turns around the standard Platonic-Christian definition of the body as the ‘prison of the soul’, what he calls ‘body’ is not simply the biological body, but is effectively already caught in some kind of presubjective psychic apparatus. Consequently, don’t we encounter in Kant a secret homologous inversion, only in the opposite direction, of the relationship between body and soul: what Kant calls ‘immortality of the soul’ is effectively the immortality of the other, ethereal, ‘undead’ body? This redoubling of the body into the common mortal body and the ethereal undead body brings us to the crux of the matter: the distinction between the two deaths, the biological death of the common mortal body and the death of the other ‘undead’ body; it is clear that what Sade aims at in his notion of a radical Crime is the murder of this second body.

Disparities, 2016 - SLAVOJ ZIZEK http://ift.tt/2oeytPG

“officially”, he strives desperately for certainty, for an unambiguous answer that would provide the remedy against the worm of doubt that is consuming him; actually, the true catastrophe he is trying to evade at any price is this very solution, the emergence of a final, unambiguous answer; which is why he endlessly sticks to his uncertain, indeterminate, oscillating status … There is a kind of reflective reversal at work here: the subject persists in his indecision and puts off the choice not because he is afraid that, by choosing one pole of the alternative, he would lose the other pole (that, in the case of Lina, by opting for innocence, she would have to accept the fact that her husband is a mere small-time crook, devoid of any inner strength, even in the direction of Evil). What he truly fears to lose is doubt as such, the uncertainty, the open state where everything is still possible the second death is prior to the first, and not after, as de Sade dreams it.’

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Sunday, 19 March 2017

Instead of being bothered by what I am for others I no longer look for a guarantee in another’s desire & assume the contingency of my being.

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“Woman is a symptom of man” seems to be one of the most notoriously “antifeminist” theses of the late Lacan. There is, however, a fundamental ambiguity as to how we are to read it: this ambiguity reflects the shift in the notion of the symptom within the Lacanian theory. 10 If we conceive the symptom as it was articulated by Lacan in the 1950s—namely as a cyphered message—then, of course, woman-symptom appears as the sign, the embodiment of man’s fall, attesting to the fact that man “gave way as to his desire.” For Freud, the symptom is a compromise formation: in the symptom, the subject gets back, in the form of a cyphered, unrecognized message, the truth about his desire, the truth that he was not able to confront, that he betrayed. So, if we read the thesis of “woman as a symptom of man” against this background, we inevitably approach the position that was most forcefully articulated by Otto Weininger, Freud’s contemporary, a notorious Viennese antifeminist and anti-Semite from the turn of the century, who wrote the extremely influential bestseller Sex and Character 11 and then commited suicide at the age of twenty-four. Weininger’s position is that, according to her very ontological status, woman is nothing but a materialization, an embodiment of man’s sin: in herself, she doesn’t exist, which is why the proper way to get rid of her is not to fight her actively or to destroy her—it is enough for man to purify his desire, to rise to pure spirituality, and, automatically, woman loses the ground under her feet, disintegrates. …We have thus the male world of pure spirituality and undistorted communication, communication without constraint (if we may be permitted to use this Habermasian syntagm), the universe of ideal intersubjectivity, and woman is not an external, active cause which lures man into a fall—she is just a consequence, a result, a materialization of man’s fall. So, when man purifies his desire of the pathological remainders, woman disintegrates in precisely the same way a symptom dissolves after successful interpretation. …If, however, we conceive the symptom as it was articulated in Lacan’s last writings as a particular signifying formation which confers on the subject its very ontological consistency, enabling it to structure its basic, constitutive relationship to enjoyment (jouissance), then the entire relationship is reversed: if the symptom is dissolved, the subject itself loses the ground under his feet, disintegrates. In this sense, “woman is a symptom of man” means that man himself exists only through woman qua his symptom: all his ontological consistency hangs on, is suspended from his symptom, is “externalized” in his symptom. men are “active,” they take refuge in relentless activity in order to escape the proper dimension of the act. The retreat of man from woman (the retreat of the hard-boiled detective from the femme fatale in film noir, for example), is thus effectively a retreat from the death drive as a radical ethical stance: the opposite of Weininger’s image of woman as incapable of a proper ethical attitude.

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Sunday, 12 March 2017

pain in nature itself, the pain which gets expressed/resolved in human speech – the Freudian Unbehagen in der Kultur thus gets supplemented by an uncanny Unbehagen in der Natur itself: imagine all of nature waiting for the gift of speech so it can express how bad it is to be a vegetable or a fish. Is it not the special torment of nature to be deprived of the means of conveying its pent-up aggravation, unable to articulate even the simplest lament, ‘Ah me! I am the sea’? And does not the emergence on earth of the speaking being effectively release this terrible organic tension and bring it to a higher level of non-resolution? While there are some intriguing passages in Lacan’s seminars where he speculates on the infinite pain of being a plant, raising the possibility of an Unbehagen in Der Natur, for the most part he conceives the relationship between nature and culture to be one of radical discontinuity.

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The Symbolic tortures/derails life, it subordinates life to a foreign compulsion, depriving it forever of its homeostasis – the move from instinct to drive, from need to desire. Within this perspective, the symbolic order is ‘always-already here’ as our unsurpassable horizon, every account of its genesis amounts to a fantasmatic obfuscation of its constitutive gap. In this Lacanian–structuralist version of the ‘hermeneutic circle’, all we can do is to circumscribe the void/impossibility which makes the Symbolic non-all and inconsistent, the void in which external limit coincides with the internal one (the void delimitates the Symbolic from the real; however, this limitation cuts into the Symbolic itself).

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Saturday, 11 March 2017

God doesn’t exist, but its inexistence leaves traces in our reality. More precisely, God qua Cause is a retroactive effect of its own traces-effects, in the same way that a political cause only exists in the series of its effects: communism only exists insofar as there are individuals fighting for it (or attacking it), motivated by it in their activity. So the idea that something exists because something else doesn’t/cannot exist could be read at two levels: first, god ex-sists (or inexists) because there is no sexual relationship; then, our ordinary reality exists because god doesn’t exist. There is a God-Woman because there is no sexual relationship, and this God-Woman doesn’t exist but merely inexists.

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“Celebration” tells us a lot about how today, in the false memory syndrome of remembering being molested by one’s parents, Freud’s Ur–Father is resuscitated. “Celebration” tells us this precisely through its artificial character. The ultimate paradox of the film is that it’s the ultimate nostalgia. This horror of the rapist father, instead of shocking us, it articulates a kind of nostalgic longing for the good old times when we had fathers who really had force, and when it was really possible to experience such traumas. This is the paradox I want to address. One would expect that fantasies are defenses against traumas. We have a traumatic experience, we cannot endure it so we build up a protective fantasy web of fictions. I claim that we invent, as a protective web, trauma itself. Now, we would normally expect that concentration camp life would be the trauma and we build a fantasy to shield ourselves from it. But perhaps the trauma is the fantasy we construct to protect ourselves from something else. But what can be worse than concentration camp life itself? Let me return again to the opposition of the two fathers, imaginary and symbolic. I claim that what these horrifying figures fill in is the gap of symbolic authority. These two fathers, protective and rapist, have nonetheless something in common although they are opposed. They both suspend the agency of symbolic law, or symbolic prohibition, the proper paternal agency of authority whose function is to introduce the childhood into the universe of social reality with its harsh demands. The reality to which the child is exposed without any maternal protective shield. …Vinterberg’s rapist father is also a father outside the constraints of the symbolic law, with access to full enjoyment. …Vinterberg’s father is this very violence outside symbolic law, and again what is missing is simply the father as symbolic authority. So what happens with the functioning of subjects when symbolic authority loses its efficiency? I claim we get subjects who are strangely de–realized, deprived of their psychology as if we are dealing with robotic puppets that are obeying some strange blind mechanism.

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we are not directly immersed into the Real. …The Real appears as something absolutely foreign/repellent – this fact already implies that we are already subjected to symbolic castration which entails the loss of the immediate identification with life. Once we are in the Symbolic the ultimate trauma is life itself. Lacan’s name for finitude is (symbolic) castration, and his name for immortality is death drive. They are the two sides of the same operation, i.e. it’s not that the substance of life, the immortal Jouissance-Thing, is ‘castrated’ by the arrival of the symbolic order. …The undead Thing is the remainder of castration, it is generated by castration, and vice versa, there is no ‘pure’ castration, castration itself is sustained by the immortal excess which eludes it.

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Monday, 6 March 2017

Sunday, 5 March 2017

the subject is always ‘decentred’

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Sunday, 5 February 2017

‘eliminating the phantasy of the Omnipotent’ is what will become, a year later (in Seminar XI), ‘traversing the fantasy’; how? It is not enough to simply assume that there is no omnipotent/omnivoyant Other? The inner link between omnipotence and impotence is a much more twisted one: the spectre of omnipotence arises out of the very experience of impotence

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fear is the fear of an external object that is perceived as posing a threat to our identity, whereas anxiety emerges when we become aware that there is something wrong with our identity itself, with what we want to protect from the feared external threat. Fear pushes us to annihilate the external object; the way to confront anxiety is to transform ourselves. The 2016 elections were the final defeat of liberal democracy, or, more precisely, of what we could call the Left-Fukuyamaist dream, and the only way to really defeat Trump and to redeem what is worth saving in liberal democracy is to perform a sectarian split from liberal democracy’s main corpse – in short, to shift the weight from Clinton to Sanders.

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the void of subjectivity is the Real which is obfuscated by the wealth of ‘inner life’

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subject (the void of pure negativity) person (the particular wealth of emotional etc. ‘pathological’ content),

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Tuesday, 31 January 2017

art has ceased to be the supreme need of the spirit’: even if excellent works are produced, ‘we bow the knee no longer’.2 This thesis of Hegel’s acquired new content with the rise of what he couldn’t forecast: the secular capitalist civilization which elevates scientific reason into the highest form of reason

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[There is a] secret solidarity between: […] the replacement of politics proper by depoliticized ‘humanitarian’ operations (humanitarian protection of human and civil rights and aid to Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda,…) [and] the violent emergence of depoliticized ‘pure Evil’ in the guise of ‘excessive’ ethnic or religious fundamentalist violence. Zizek, “Carl Schmitt in the Age of Post-Politics” ‘postmodern racism’ emerges as the ultimate consequence…of the reduction of the state to a mere police-agent servicing the…needs of market forces ======== zizek on how the one becomes one in recognizing its split - Ihre Notiz bei Position 104 | Hinzugefügt am Montag, 16. November 2015 17:38:38 The thing to do is to distinguish between objects which are..desired..and the object..which functions as a ‘negative magnitude’..desired as the stand in for Nothingness. SLAVOJ ZIZEK Absolute Otherness’ is 'the subjct beyond subjectivization,’ beyond the 'big Oter’: 'the subject not bound by the symbolic pact and as such identical to the Other’s gaze’. The subject is the 'point of failure of every identification’ Absolute Otherness is 'epitomized by the Other’s gaze into camera’ by the villain in Hitchcock’s films Zizek says. ========== zizek on how the one becomes one in recognizing its split - Ihre Markierung bei Position 105-105 | Hinzugefügt am Montag, 16. November 2015 17:51:26 difference ========== zizek on how the one becomes one in recognizing its split - Ihre Notiz bei Position 105 | Hinzugefügt am Montag, 16. November 2015 17:52:37 Absolute Otherness is 'epitomized by the’ villain’s 'gaze into camera’ in Hitchcock’s films Zizek says. ========== zizek on how the one becomes one in recognizing its split - Ihre Notiz bei Position 105 | Hinzugefügt am Montag, 16. November 2015 18:16:43 By making us accomplices with the villaine, Hitchcock makes us experience the absolute Otherness of the unrerentable as such, in short, the experience of the object gaze, brought about by being looked at as viewes directly by the villain’s gaze to camera. Normally the chance to look someone directly into their eyes facilitates a deeper understanding ofwho they are. That we cannot fathom the villain in this way at all despite being given the opportunity to see into his eyes is what makes the unsymbolizability of wat goes on in the film even more traumatic. The place 'of the unrepresentable’ coincides with 'the viewer reduced to pure gaze’. Even from the seemingly allknowing and allseeing position of pure objective access to gazing from the nearest deepestseeing positions which one would normally never have access to is not giving insigts and symbolizations at all and this is why seeing the villain head on is traumatic. His gaze separates the viewer from the symbolic community and makes’ the viewer an accomplice, Zizek says ========== zizek on how the one becomes one in recognizing its split - Ihre Markierung bei Position 105-105 | Hinzugefügt am Montag, 16. November 2015 18:16:43 name ========== zizek on how the one becomes one in recognizing its split - Ihre Notiz bei Position 105 | Hinzugefügt am Montag, 16. November 2015 19:09:01 'Becase I think it is only’ a 'self-image I adopt in virtual space, I can be there much more truthful’, Zizek says. The void as core 'of our subjectivity’ is 'filled in by appearances,’ Zizek says. women often are more aware of the emptiness at the core of s was so much alone as a child that I enjoy too much being alone. Loving for me is a way to keep hiding from the rest of the world.†— Andre Vantino enjoy your symptom or as Oscar Wilde says, the way to get rid of a desire is to follow through with it and grant oneself small pleasures. Fantasies are desired differently than small pleasures. We avoid following our fantasies to the end of the fantasy because if we didn’t the emptiness of the fantasy would become too obvious. 'Through disregard for our gaze,’ something asserts its divine character’ even when not at all intending to 'hide anything from us’, Miran Bozovic writes. experienced as a simple formal framework for the coexistence of the multiplicity of ethnic, religious or life-style communities. Modernism in Reverse 
 This gradual collapse—or, rather, loss of substance—of the ‘American dream’ bears witness to the unexpected reversal of the passage from primary to secondary identification described by Hegel: in our ‘postmodern’ societies, the ‘abstract’ institution of secondary identification is increasingly experienced as an external, purely formal frame that is not really binding, so that one is more and more looking for support in ‘primordial’, usually smaller (ethnic, religious) forms of identification. Even when these forms of identification are more ‘artificial’ than national identification—as is the case with the gay community—they are more ‘immediate’ in the sense of seizing the individual directly and overwhelmingly, in his specific ‘way of life’, Slavoj - Multiculturalism or the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism in contrast to the ‘nationalization of the ethnic’—the de-ethnicization, the ‘sublation’ (Aufhebung) of the ethnic into the national—we are now dealing with the ‘ethnicization of the national’, with a renewed search for (or reconstitution of) ‘ethnic roots’. Slavoj - Multiculturalism or the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism Multiculturalism is a racism which empties its own position of all positive content (the multiculturalist is not a direct racist, he doesn’t oppose to the Other the particular values of his own culture), but nonetheless retains this position as the privileged empty point of universality from which one is able to appreciate (and depreciate) properly other particular cultures—the multiculturalist respect for the Other’s specificity is the very form of asserting one’s own superiority. My father is a Schindler Jew by Les White If Schindler is an enigma, if his actions as he evolves from carpetbagger to savior cannot be explained - as many including Spielberg contend - why then does the film give reasons for the Nazis’ behavior? The Nazis are portrayed as alcoholics, often partying and orgiastic (all Schindler has to do to gain another concession is present a bottle of wine). Anton Goeth usually kills when drunk. Because his status as antagonist serves to represent the Nazis as a whole, we are led to surmise that the Holocaust can he blamed on alcohol abuse. Perhaps the Holocaust would have never happened had Goeth and company accepted their addiction and gone to AA. (In contrast, Schindler has to goad the Jewish accountant into having a drink.) The movie reflects certain mores in today’s United States: a popular acceptance of victimization and an AA philosophy of “powerlessness,” with its presumption that alcoholism is one of the main causes of society’s ills. The film depicts the Nazi movement as disorderly and confused, not highly organized: e.g., it does not execute genocide with cool efficiency. SCHINDLER’S LIST ascribes reasons to the Holocaust. Goeth seems to kill only those who are infirm, not willing to follow orders, or sitting down on the job: i.e., the one-armed man, the woman architect whining about faulty construction, the slow hinge maker, and the boy failing to scrub out a stain. These are reprehensible reasons to kill but reasons nonetheless. Even when Goeth takes a practice shot from his balcony, he kills a fat babushka taking a break and sitting down outside a line of hard workers. Yet my father is by accident the only survivor from his family. His mother and sister were shot, his father and youngest brother were gassed, and his other brother was hung indiscriminately. My father is a Schindler Jew by Les White comparisons of SCHINDLER’S LIST to Spielberg’s other movies cannot he overlooked. Schindler does come off like a super-human Indiana Jones or the archaeologists in Jurassic Park. The Nazis can he compared to the dinosaurs running loose in JURASSIC PARK or to the shark in JAWS: nature that cannot be wholly controlled, but nature that can be explained as primitive. The Jews-the pitiful Jews showing fear - represent the child in us, like the Indian children rescued by Indiana Jones or the children scared by dinosaurs in JURASSIC PARK. SCHINDLER’S LIST backs off from showing us starving concentration camp inmates who, if lucky to remain alive had to release their souls from their bodies in order to survive as emotionless robots. To have thought about the surrounding horrors would have killed one’s will to live. To have reacted to the horrors would have called undue attention to oneself and more than likely have resulted in being shot on the spot. The audience’s horror is mitigated because the faces shown mirror our own fear. How differently we would react if we were watching the concentration camp inmates remain impassive, expecting their treatment. We would be outraged that people can treat other people so senselessly, and we might face the painful truth that all of us have within ourselves the capacity to accept such treatment or be killed or even work in the camps in such a way that we partake in killing our own. SCHINDLER’S LIST puts a face on the Holocaust which makes it more comfortable for the audience. David Attenborough - Wikipedia the free encyclopedia Life series, in conjunction with the BBC Natural History Unit, David Attenborough - Wikipedia the free encyclopedia The Amber Time Machine. David Attenborough - Wikipedia the free encyclopedia The Ascent of Man David Attenborough - Wikipedia the free encyclopedia , Civilisation David Attenborough - Wikipedia the free encyclopedia series Eastwards with Attenborough, David Attenborough - Wikipedia the free encyclopedia The Tribal Eye, ) David Attenborough - Wikipedia the free encyclopedia The Explorers, ). David Attenborough - Wikipedia the free encyclopedia Fabulous Animals (), David Attenborough - Wikipedia the free encyclopedia Attenborough has continued as one of the presenters of BBC Radio ’s “Tweet of the Day”, David Attenborough - Wikipedia the free encyclopedia David Attenborough’s Life Stories David Attenborough - Wikipedia the free encyclopedia Americans are just extraordinarily unaware of all kinds of things. If you live in the middle of that vast continent, with apparently everything your heart could wish for just because you were born there, then why worry? David Attenborough - Wikipedia the free encyclopedia “We are a plague on the Earth. It’s coming home to roost over the next years or so. It’s not just climate change; it’s sheer space, places to grow food David Attenborough - Wikipedia the free encyclopedia too many people for too little land. That’s what it’s about. And we are blinding ourselves. We say, get the United Nations to send them bags of flour. That’s barmy David Attenborough - Wikipedia the free encyclopedia think instead of a parasitic worm that is boring through the eye of a boy sitting on the bank of a river in West Africa, [a worm] that’s going to make him blind. And [I ask them], 'Are you telling me that the God you believe in, who you also say is an all-merciful God, who cares for each one of us individually, are you saying that God created this worm that can live in no other way than in an innocent child’s eyeball? Because that doesn’t seem to me to coincide with a God who’s full of mercy’. David Attenborough - Wikipedia the free encyclopedia when Creationists talk about God creating every individual species as a separate act, they always instance hummingbirds, or orchids, sunflowers and beautiful things. But I tend to think instead of a parasitic worm that is boring through the eye of a boy sitting on the bank of a river in West Africa, [a worm] that’s going to make him blind. And [I ask them], 'Are you telling me that the God you believe in, who you also say is an all-merciful God, who cares for each one of us individually, are you saying that God created this worm that can live in no other way than in an innocent child’s eyeball? Because that doesn’t seem to me to coincide with a God who’s full of mercy’. David Attenborough - Wikipedia the free encyclopedia Darwin and the Tree of Life. In reference to the programme, Attenborough David Attenborough - Wikipedia the free encyclopedia it is not a theory. Evolution is as solid a historical fact as you could conceive. Evidence from every quarter. What is a theory is whether natural selection is the mechanism and the only mechanism. That is a theory. But the historical reality that dinosaurs led to birds and mammals produced whales, that’s not theory.“[] David Attenborough - Wikipedia the free encyclopedia The licence fee is the basis on which the BBC is based and if you destroy it, broadcasting… becomes a wasteland.[] David Attenborough - Wikipedia the free encyclopedia "David Attenborough: My tears for my dear old brother”. Mail Online Slavoj - What can psychoanalysis tell us about cyberspace What we get here is another version of the kingdom of Tarzan or She: in Rider Haggard’s She, Freud’s notorious claim that feminine sexuality is a “dark continent” is realized in a literal way: she-who-must-be-obeyed, this Master be- yond Law, the possessor of the Secret of Life itself, is a White Woman ruling in the midst of Africa, the dark continent. This figure of She, of a woman who exists (in the unexplored Be- yond), is the necessary fantasmatic support of the patriarchal universe. With the advent of modern science, this Beyond is abolished, there is no longer a “dark continent” which generates a Secret—and, consequently, Meaning is also lost, since the field of Meaning is by definition sustained by an impenetrable dark spot in its very heart. Slavoj - What can psychoanalysis tell us about cyberspace for Heidegger, modern sci- ence stands for the metaphysical “danger”: It poses a threat to the universe of meaning. There is no meaning without some dark spot, without some forbidden/impenetrable domain into which we project fantasies which guarantee our horizon of meaning. Perhaps, this very growing disenchantment of our ac- tual social world accounts for the fascination exerted by cyber- space: It is as if, in it, we encounter again a Limit beyond which the mysterious domain of the fantasmatic Otherness opens up, as if the screen of the interface is today’s version of the blank, of the unknown region Slavoj - What can psychoanalysis tell us about cyberspace universe is thus in a sense more “open” than the universe of science: It implies the gateway into the indefinite Beyond, while the direct global model of the mod- ern science is effectively “closed,” i.e., it allows for no Beyond. The universe of modern science, in its very “meaninglessness,” involves the gesture of “going through fantasy,” of abolishing the dark spot, the domain of the Unexplained which harbors fantasies and thus guarantees Meaning: Instead of it, we get the meaningless mechanism.

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Monday, 30 January 2017

It is as if Richard is driven to such an extreme of painful madness with this music that, for him, the only way to get rid of this unbearable pressure of music is to directly identify with it … In one of the episodes of the 1945 British horror omnibus Dead of the Night, Michael Redgrave plays the ventriloquist who becomes jealous of his dummy, gnawed by the suspicion that it wants to leave him for a competitor; at the episode’s end, after destroying the dummy by way of thrashing its head, he is hospitalized; after reawakening from psychic coma, he identifies with his symptom (the dummy), starting to talk and contorting his face like it. …Richard enacts a properly psychotic identification with the symptom, with the musical rhythm as the cipher of his destiny: like an alien intruder, music parasitizes, colonizes him… …Since it is structurally impossible for him to get rid of the symptom, the only way out of it, the only way to resolve the tension, is to directly identify with the symptom, to become one’s own symptom – in exact homology to Hitchcock’s Psycho at the end of which the only way for Norman to get rid of his mother is to identify with her directly, to let her take over his personality and, using his body as a ventriloquist uses his dummy, speak through him

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one of the most disturbing TV episodes of Alfred Hitchcock Presents, ‘The Glass Eye’ (the opening episode of the third year). Jessica Tandy (again – the very actress who was the original Mouth!) plays here a lone woman who falls for a handsome ventriloquist, Max Collodi (a reference to the author of Pinocchio). When she gathers the courage to approach him alone in his quarters, she declares her love for him and steps forward to embrace him, only to find that she is holding in her hands a wooden dummy’s head; after she withdraws in horror, the ‘dummy’ stands up and pulls off its mask, and we see the face of a sad older dwarf who starts to jump desperately on the table, asking the woman to go away … The ventriloquist is in fact the dummy, while the hideous dummy is the actual ventriloquist. …The partial object, which is effectively alive, and whose dead puppet the ‘real’ person is: the ‘real’ person is merely alive, a survival machine, a ‘human animal’, while the apparently ‘dead’ supplement is the focus of excessive Life.

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This enigma of the Other’s desire is an enigma for the Other itself. Only at this level do we reach ‘symbolic castration’ which does not stand for the subject’s ‘castration’, for his/her being at the mercy of the big Other, for his/her depending on its whims, but for the ‘castration’ of this Other itself. The barred Other is thus not just the depersonalized Other but also the bar which cracks this depersonalized Other itself.

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Friday, 27 January 2017

Is making people ‘see what it is they do feel’ not bringing about a kind of self-knowledge? (An elementary case of ‘seeing’ would be to discern the ambiguous hatred beneath which the analyst suspects there is hidden love [or vice versa].) The answer is that knowledge gained in analysis is a knowledge to be forgotten, discarded: once I ‘see what it is that I feel’, I don’t go on dwelling in it, I just leave it behind – why? Not because of some decisionist mystique (‘to be creative, one should overcome Hamlet-like procrastinations, too much self-analysing, and just do it!’) but because the true task of analysis is to open up a void in the midst of our subjectivity: when we discard the knowledge gained in analysis, we open ourselves to this void. Therein resides the link between analysis and love: in love we really do know the other person in some profound sense – and also we really don’t. And you could think that the fantasy of knowing is spurred by or prompted by something like ‘this person has a powerful effect on me and it’s so overwhelming that I’m going to manage this through a fantasy of knowledge’. For Proust, for example, knowing people is often very much about dealing with the anxiety that one can’t control them.3 Disparities (Slavoj Žižek) 4132-4135Wednesday, 18 January 17:44:34 the subject is the retroactive effect of the failure of its representation. It is because of this failure that the subject is divided – not into something and something else, but into something (its symbolic representation) and nothing, and fantasy fills the void of this nothingness. And the catch is that this symbolic representation of the subject is primordially not its own: prior to speaking, I am spoken

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