critical theory with slavoj zizek: Judith Butler pointed out that the Foucauldian ‘body’ as the site of resistance is none other than the Freudian ‘psyche’: paradoxically, ‘body’ is Foucault’s name for the psychic apparatus insofar as it resists the soul’s domination. That is to say, when, in his well-known definition of the soul as the ‘prison of the body’, Foucault turns around the standard Platonic-Christian definition of the body as the ‘prison of the soul’, what he calls ‘body’ is not simply the biological body, but is effectively already caught in some kind of presubjective psychic apparatus. Consequently, don’t we encounter in Kant a secret homologous inversion, only in the opposite direction, of the relationship between body and soul: what Kant calls ‘immortality of the soul’ is effectively the immortality of the other, ethereal, ‘undead’ body? This redoubling of the body into the common mortal body and the ethereal undead body brings us to the crux of the matter: the distinction between the two deaths, the biological death of the common mortal body and the death of the other ‘undead’ body; it is clear that what Sade aims at in his notion of a radical Crime is the murder of this second body.